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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
PATRICIA BARBER, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
SAM JOHN BARBER, JR. 
Defendant/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Case No. 960783-CA 
Civil No. 924901656 DA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
SAM JOHN BARBER, JR, 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated, § 78-2a-3(2)(h). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Whether the charitable contributions made by the 
businesses in which Sam Barber owned an interest should be imputed 
to Mr. Barber as income based on the trial court's findings that 
Mr. Barber lacks the ability to withdraw the funds as salary and 
that his business interests were valued based on the presumption 
that the contributions would remain in the businesses. Standard of 
Review: 
When challenging a trial court!s findings of 
fact, the party must "marshal all the evidence 
supporting the trial court's findings and then 
show the evidence to be legally 
insufficient to support the findings." If the 
party challenging the finding fails to marshal 
the supporting evidence, the trial court's 
finding will not be disturbed on appeal. 
Breinholt v. Breinholt. 905 P.2d 877, 882 (Utah App. 1995) 
(citations omitted). This issue was preserved in the trial court 
as reflected by Finding of Fact No. 9. 
II. Whether the trial court erred in its factual findings 
regarding the parties' incomes and expenses used to set alimony and 
child support. Standard of Review: 
When challenging a trial court's findings of 
fact, the party must "marshal all the evidence 
supporting the trial court's findings and then 
show the evidence to be legally 
insufficient to support the findings." If the 
party challenging the finding fails to marshal 
the supporting evidence, the trial court's 
finding will not be disturbed on appeal. 
Breinholt v. Breinholt. 905 P.2d 877, 882 (Utah App. 1995) 
(citations omitted). This issue was preserved in the trial court 
as reflected by Findings of Fact Nos. 9, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 
52, 53, and 54, and Sam John Barber's written closing arguments. 
III. Whether the trial court correctly valued Sam Barber's 
business interests. Standard of review: A trial court's actions 
regarding the parties' property interests are entitled to a 
presumption of validity, thus, the trial court's valuation of 
marital property will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of 
discretion. Breinholt v. Breinholt. 905 P.2d 877, 882 (Utah App. 
1995) The issue was preserved in the trial court reflected by the 
Findings of Fact Nos. 17 through 45 and Sam John Barber's written 
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closing arguments. 
IV. Whether the trial court erred in awarding alimony to 
Plaintiff for a time period equal to the length of the parties' 
marriage. A trial court's decision regarding alimony and child 
support will not be disturbed absent manifest injustice or inequity 
that indicates a clear abuse of discretion. Jensen v. Bowcutt. 892 
P.2d 1053, 1055 (Utah App. 1995). Howell v. Howell. 806 P.2d 1209, 
1211 (Utah App. 1991). While the trial court's findings of fact in 
divorce appeals are reviewed under the "clearly erroneous 
standard", its conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness and 
given no special deference on appeal. Bingham v. Bingham 872 p.2d 
1065, 1067 (Utah App. 1994). The Plaintiff failed to preserve a 
claim for alimony that would run longer than the term of the 
parties' marriage in the lower court proceedings. 
V. Whether the Plaintiff's intentional acts in delaying 
these proceedings constitutes an alternative basis for affirmance 
of the trial court's decision. Standard of review: An appellate 
court may affirm the trial court on any proper grounds. Buehner 
Block Co. v. UWC Associates. 752 P.2d 892 (Utah 1988). This issue 
was preserved in the trial court as reflected by Findings of Fact 
55, 56 and 57 and in Sam John Barber's written closing arguments. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant accepts Plaintiff's statement of the case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
History of Marriage. The parties were married on September 
3 
10, 1977. (Finding of Fact No. 1). They had been married less 
than 15 years when the plaintiff filed this divorce action on 
August 5, 1992. (R. at 1, 28)1. Two children were born during the 
marriage, Angela, age 18, at the time of trial, who graduated from 
high school three months after trial, and Adrian, born May 29, 
1981. (T. at 22-23) . Pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, 
Plaintiff was awarded custody of the parties' children. At the 
time of trial, plaintiff was 44 and defendant was 45 years of age. 
(T. at 22, 80). Defendant was in an airplane crash in August of 
1995 and lost his right eye. (T. at. 165). A significant portion 
of the Defendant's work responsibilities involves reading and 
analyzing reports. (T. at 166). Although the defendant had been 
able to perform those functions 9 to 10 hours a day prior to the 
accident, the strain on his eye has now limited his ability perform 
those tasks for a daily maximum of three to four hours. (T. at 
166; Finding of Fact No. 60). 
Expenses and income of Mrs, Barber- until 1992, the year of 
the parties' separation, the parties had relied primarily on Mr. 
Barber's income. (T. at 27). Mr. Barber's annual income had 
ranged between $30,000 in 1981 to $60,000 in 1991 while the parties 
were together, not including any benefits provided by his company. 
(T. at 1071, Ex. 52). Mr. Barber paid approximately 34 percent of 
Plaintiff has denominated all record citations denoted by 
"R" as citations to the transcript rather than the record. In an 
attempt to minimize confusion, Defendant has listed all citations 
containing the transcript with a "T" to remain consistent with 
the Plaintiff's use of the transcript. All citations containing 
an "R" in this brief are citations to the record on appeal and 
contain primarily pleadings, notices and minute entries. 
4 
his gross income in taxes, which would have left the entire family 
with approximately $3,333 per month in 1991. (T. at 1051; Finding 
of Fact No. 50). In 1992, Mr. Barber's entire after-tax income 
would have only been approximately $3,500. (T at 1158). 
Plaintiff claimed at trial that her monthly expenses were 
$5,481.00 (T. at 45-52; Exhibit 2). Sam Barber carefully analyzed 
the Plaintiff's expenses and pointed out where they were 
substantially over-inflated and inaccurate. (T. at 1071). He 
indicated specifically where Mrs. Barber had made errors in her 
calculations for a housekeeper, utilities, food, clothing, 
children's allowances, entertainment, Angela's tuition and other 
items which reduced Mrs. Barber's necessary monthly expenses for 
her and Adrian to $3,345 per month. (T. at 1071-79; Ex. 52). The 
trial court determined that $3,345 was the true amount of Mrs. 
Barber's monthly expenses. (T. 1071-79; Ex. 52; Finding of Fact 
No.51). 
At the time of trial, plaintiff was employed at Dillards 
Department Store earning $8.00 per hour, thirty-five hours a week, 
or approximately $1,213.00 per month. (R. at 405). 
Expenses and Income of Mr. Barber. Sam Barber testified that 
his reasonable and necessary monthly living expenses were $3,680 
per month. (T. at 1079-83; Exhibit.79). The lower court found Mr. 
Barber's income fell in a range between $3,200 and $3,680 per 
month. (Finding of Fact No. 47). A comparison of Exhibits 52 and 
79 reveals that Mr. Barber's expenses were greater than Mrs. 
Barber's expenses primarily as a result of Mr. Barber's need to 
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incur significantly greater debt to pay for the costs associated 
with furnishing an apartment and pay for his business valuations 
and attorneys fees. Mr. Barber's expenses set forth at trial do 
not even include the debt that Mr. Barber was ordered to incur to 
pay Mrs. Barber the $64,159 initial down payment toward Mrs. 
Barber's share of the parties' business interests. (See Finding of 
Fact No. 43). The amount of this debt obviously was unknown until 
the lower court issued its decision. Mrs. Barber, in contrast, was 
awarded this initial lump sum of $64,159 toward the business buyout 
in addition to her monthly payments. (Finding of Fact No. 43). 
Mark Papanikolas, the C.P.A. for the Barber Bros, entities, 
was requested by the Court during the trial to determine Mr. 
Barber's income including base salary, bonuses, the value of any 
perks that Mr. Barber had received, and all contributions made by 
the businesses based on Mr. Barber's ownership. (T. at 1016-17). 
Mr. Papanikolas testified that Sam Barber's base salary at the 
time of trial was $78,000 (T. at 98, 1038) but that he also 
received an annual bonus that had averaged approximately $8,000 per 
year. (T at 1038). Mr. Papanikolas also attributed the value of 
all benefits Sam Barber received through the Barber Bros, entities, 
regardless of whether Mr. Barber could actually convert the benefit 
to cash. (T. at 1038-42). These benefits included the value of 
personal auto use for Mr. Barber and his daughter Angela, his 
personal use of credit cards and a cabin owned by the company, the 
health club dues paid by the business for him, and the family 
portion of any business trips paid by either the Barber Bros. 
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businesses or the manufacturer. (T. at 1038-42). The total value 
of Mr. Barber's salary, bonuses, benefits and perks, not including 
any attribution of the businesses1 charitable contributions, 
amounted to $96,300 per year, or $8,025 per month. (T. at 1038-42; 
Exhibit 51; Finding of Fact No.7). 
Business Interests. Sam Barber is employed through a group of 
automobile dealerships and related entities that he owns with his 
three brothers, Charles, Fred and John. The businesses and Sam 
Barber's respective interests are as follows: 
Company Sam Barber's » Type 
Barber Bros. Pontiac-Oldsmobile, Inc. 51.50% "S" Corp. 
Barber Bros. Imports, Inc. 44.00% "S" Corp. 
Barber Bros. Motor Company, Inc. 3 9.03% "C" Corp. 
Barber Bros. Automotive Services, Inc. 25.00% "S" Corp. 
Barber Bros. Limited Partnership 25.00% Lim. Part. 
The future of the Pontiac-Olds dealership is very much in 
doubt. (T. at 1125-28). Sam Barber testified that General Motors 
was terminating the dealership's right to sell one of its two 
existing automobile lines, Oldsmobile, as part of GM's 
consolidation plan known as Project 2000. (T. at 1209). He 
further testified that it was very uncertain whether the dealership 
would be able to keep the Pontiac line. (T. at 1127) . He read 
from the Dealer Sales and Service Agreement with GM which clearly 
indicated that GM was not required to pay the dealership anything 
for goodwill upon GM's withdrawal of an automotive line. (T. at 
1210-1212; Exhibit 86) . The Pontiac-Olds entity has had wide 
fluctuations in earnings. (T. at 850). 
The Imports dealership is severely undercapitalized and 
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sustained total losses of nearly of $350,000 in 1990 and 1991. 
(Exhibit 34 at its Exhibit 11). Its sales have fluctuated widely 
since that time. Id. 
The Motor Company has recently been required by General Motors 
to build a large new building to keep the GM lines separate in all 
respects (i.e. sales, service and parts) from the Chrysler lines 
sold by the Dealership. (T. at 936-37). As a result of the new 
building, costs at the dealership had increased by an amount in 
excess of $100,000 per month at the Motor Company during the four 
months prior to trial. (T. at 1113). 
Automotive Services is a captive company that depends on the 
three dealerships for its existence. (T. at 952) . It provides the 
in-house warranties and finance and insurance services for the 
dealerships. (T. at 146) . Because the company has no way to gauge 
the quality of components made by the manufacturers of the products 
it warrants, substantial uncertainty exists in knowing whether the 
amounts charged to customers to cover the warranties or finance and 
insurance charge backs were adequate. (T. at 953). 
There is substantial interplay and interchange between the 
above companies. (T. at 151). The Barber Bros. Limited 
Partnership is not an income producing entity and merely owns the 
building and land upon which the Imports dealership is located (T. 
at 948) . 
Each of the four Barber brothers has a specific area of 
responsibility and are paid from earnings of a different company. 
(T. at 186). Sam Barber manages Barber Bros. Pontiac-Oldsmobile, 
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Fred Barber manages Barber Bros. Motor Company, Charles Barber 
oversees Barber Bros. Imports and each draws their salary from the 
company they oversee. John Barber oversees used car operations in 
all three dealerships and is paid by Barber Bros. Automotive 
Services, since that entity is a captive company providing warranty 
services to only the three dealerships. (T. at 154-155). 
The four brothers meet in director meetings once per month and 
discuss the operations in the four businesses. (T. at 196). 
Although the brothers each have their assigned areas of 
responsibility, they will assist and help each other as needed. 
(T. at 185-186) . For example, when the Imports Co. was struggling 
and sustaining substantial losses in the early 1990's, Sam Barber 
would work at the dealership to assist in its operation. (T. at 
185-86) . 
The four Brothers have set their salaries on an approximately 
equal basis. (T. at 168-74). There are slight differences in 
their salaries based on small bonuses (up to $1,000 per month) for 
achieving performance objectives, but the Brothers have gone to 
great lengths to equalize their base incomes. (T. at 169, 1038). 
For example, because Fred Barber and Charles Barber each pay for 
one of their parent's automobiles, they are paid more to account 
for it. (T. at 173). Similarly, when Fred Barber has paid the 
charitable contributions attributable to the Motor Company, he is 
compensated for that amount to keep the salaries equal. (T. at 
172-73) . 
The brothers have had a close working relationship that has 
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allowed them to remain in business for nearly 15 years. (T. at 
174). When making decisions, they attempt to build consensus among 
themselves and have never been required to actually vote their 
percentage ownership in their respective companies. (T. at 193). 
The business relationship between the brothers has worked well 
because each brother has been reluctant to take a hard stand on 
issues but defers to what the majority has wanted. (T. at 198-
200) . 
Because of this high degree of respect, Sam Barber does not 
have the ability to control his brothers and do whatever he wants, 
even though he owns a majority interest in the Pontiac-Olds 
dealership. (T. at 99-100; 960-961). He cannot fix his salary 
without consideration of his brothers feelings and obtaining their 
approval. (T. at 98-99). Both Sam Barber and Mark Papanikolas 
testified at trial that Sam Barber's desires are frequently 
overruled by his brothers. (T. at 187, 960-962). If he were to 
unilaterally raise his salary, the other brothers would want an 
equal amount. (T. at 976). Such an action would cause great 
disruption and disharmony and threaten the very existence of the 
businesses. (T. at 174-76). 
The four brothers have a business philosophy based on their 
religious beliefs that the businesses should pay charitable 
contributions of approximately ten percent of the net profits of 
each business. (T. at 161-65). The contributions are determined 
by all four brothers. (T. at 120, 146) . The businesses contribute 
to a variety of different organizations in the community. (T. at 
10 
163). For example, in 1994, (by far the most profitable year) the 
Pontiac-Olds dealership made charitable donations to forty 
different charities and community organizations. (T. at 1105; 
Exhibit 65) . One result of the contributions has been a very 
substantial number of car sales to people in the organizations to 
whom contributions have been made. Sam Barber testified that the 
dealerships sell a greater number of cars through their charitable 
contributions than through advertising. (T. at 165). 
Each of the four business valuators in this matter recognized 
that the charitable contributions were made by the businesses, 
rather than the individual brothers, and added back the 
contributions to the profits of each of the businesses. (Yeanoplos 
- Exhibit 12 at 17; Dorton - Exhibit 28 at 12; Schmidt - Exhibit 13 
at 3; Papanikolas - Exhibit 16 at 5). The valuators then 
multiplied the adjusted higher amount of profits by a multiplier of 
anywhere from 1.25 to 4.7 to establish the value of the business. 
Id. If the charitable contributions had been considered salary to 
the brothers, then the funds would not have been assumed to remain 
in the business and value of the businesses would have been 
considerably reduced under each of the valuations. (T. at 1218). 
All of the Barber Bros. entities are severely 
undercapitalized. (T. at 1090-1094). The various automobile 
manufacturers have specific working capital requirements which 
specify the minimum amount of working capital each dealership must 
maintain. Id- The dealers are required to report the amount of 
capital in monthly reports to the manufacturer. Id. If a dealer 
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fails to maintain sufficient working capital, the manufacturer may 
terminate the franchise agreement with the dealership, depriving 
the dealership of cars to sell. (T. at 1092). 
General Motors required the Pontiac-Olds dealership to 
maintain working capital of $596,000 but the dealership carried 
only $410,000 in working capital. (T. at 1091; Exhibit 53). The 
Motor Company's working capital requirement was $675,000 but it 
maintained only $520,000. (T. at 1093; Exhibit 54). The Imports 
dealership carried only about one-half of the required $500,000 in 
working capital. (T. at 1094). If the Barber Bros, were to 
suddenly begin removing additional funds from the businesses 
through increased salaries, there is a substantial risk that the 
automobile manufacturers would terminate the franchise. (T. at 
1092; Finding of Fact No. 17). 
The automobile industry is extremely cyclical and the Barber 
Bros, entities are no exception. (T. at 916; 1123). These cycles 
can clearly be seen through an examination of the dealer's profits 
in the three dealerships as set forth in their respective tax 
returns as summarized by Mark Papanikolas in Exhibit 16. 
Dealer 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Pontiac-Olds <152,500> <48,800> 76,900 359,700 261,100 
Motor Company < 82,700> <17,400> 50,400 237,100 360,000 
Imports 6,000 <600> 139,800 23,900 
(Exhibit at 5, 9, 13) . Sam Barber testified in his twenty-six 
years in the car business, he has seen many cycles and the outlook 
for the industry was very cyclical. (T. at 1123-1124) . He further 
testified that the top of the business cycle likely occurred in 
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1994. Id. He specifically indicated that there was currently a 
downward trend in profitability. Id. Kent Schmidt testified that 
the 1994 sales year was an unusually large aberration because it 
was an exceedingly high year. (T. at 313). 
Business Evaluations. The Court heard testimony from four 
business valuators at trial. Kent Schmidt and Mark Papanikolas 
valued the businesses on behalf of Mr. Barber. Kevin Yeanoplos and 
David Dorton valued the businesses on behalf of Mrs. Barber. 
Kent Schmidt. Kent Schmidt formed a business known as 
National Business Brokers in 1977 which sells a variety of 
different types of business. (T. at 285). His business has valued 
and sold over 1,600 businesses since its inception. (T. at 287). 
Mr. Schmidt has personally specialized the sale of Automobile 
dealerships and franchises and has valued approximately 3 00 to 400 
automobile dealerships/franchises since 1984. (T. at 287-88). He 
had valued 3 0 to 4 0 automobile dealerships/franchises in the year 
prior to trial, 11 of which had been sold. (T. at 288) . Mr. 
Schmidt valued the business based upon the universal standard of 
value as follows: "cash or cash equivalent price for which 
property would change hands between a willing buyer and willing 
seller, both being adequately informed of all relevant facts and 
neither being compelled to buy or sell." (T. at 3 02). 
Mr. Schmidt utilized the method to value the Barber car 
dealerships that is normally used between buyers and sellers in the 
car industry nationwide. (T. at 354-55). The method involved 
establishing the true market value of the equity of the businesses 
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through making appropriate adjustments to book value and then 
adding to that equity a factor for goodwill by taking a multiplier 
of adjusted earnings. (Exhibits 13, 14, 15) . Although he 
acknowledged that the method was sometimes referred to as a "rule 
of thumb" method, he clarified that phrase is actually a misnomer 
because the method requires taking all relevant facts into account 
through adjustments and through setting an appropriate multiplier. 
(T. at 352-53) . 
Mr. Schmidt also applied a discount of 2 0 percent for a lack 
of marketability of Mr. Barber's interest in the businesses he 
evaluated. (T. at 321). He explained that a lack marketability 
discount was required by investors or buyers based on their 
inability to sell their interest. (T. at 322). He indicated that 
such discounts typically ranged between 20 and 70 percent and he 
desired to be conservative and accept the lower value. (T. at 
322) . 
He further took and a discount of 30 percent for Mr. Barber's 
minority interest in all entities other than the Pontiac-Olds 
dealership. (T. at 331-33) . He explained that a 30 percent 
discount was the accepted discount in this type of situation 
although the interest in fact may not be able to be sold to anyone. 
(T. at 332). He also explained that the discount was taken because 
a minority shareholder cannot control the entity and therefore a 
minority interest is less desirable. (T. at 333-34; 378-79). 
Mr. Schmidt determined his multiplier of earnings based upon 
the desirability of the automotive lines carried (T. at 308), the 
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expected sales in a given market (T. at 3 07) , and the history of 
the income stream (T. at 308) . Based on the differences in the 
dealerships, he used a multiplier of two for the Motor Company and 
1.25 for the Pontiac-Olds and Imports dealerships. (T. at 308. 
Mr. Schmidt specifically considered the report of GM's Project 2000 
in his analysis. (T. at 353). 
Mr. Schmidt also made a large number of technical adjustments 
that revealed his experience in selling dealerships and knowledge 
of each of the dealerships. (T. at 313-20; 327-31; 337-42). He 
made an adjustment to inventory in the Pontiac-Olds store and also 
took into consideration the tax impact of the adjustment. (T. at 
315) . He added back depreciation only after he did a complete 
walk-through of the businesses and viewed every piece of equipment. 
(T. at 317; 371-72). He took an average of earnings to minimize 
the aberration cause by the extremely large sales in 1994. (T. at 
313) . He also added the charitable contributions made by the 
businesses back into the profits of the business, presuming they 
had stayed there. (T. at 309). 
Mark Papanikolas. Mark Papanikolas also valued the Barber 
Bros, businesses at the request of Sam Barber. Mr. Papanikolas had 
been the C.P.A. for the various Barber businesses since their 
inception. (T. at 880) . Mr. Papanikolas had experience in valuing 
five businesses other than the Barber Bros, entities, one of which 
was a car dealership of significantly larger size. (T. at 880). 
He also had performed accounting work for seven different 
automobile dealerships other than Barber Bros, and had two other 
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automobile dealers as current clients. (T. at 884). 
Mr. Papanikolas relied on IRS ruling 59-60 which sets forth 
eight factors to be considered in valuing a business. (T. at 883) . 
He described how each of the eight factors related to the Barber 
Bros, businesses. He pointed out that Sec. 4.02 (d) of IRS ruling 
59-60 specifically required that "detailed profit and loss 
statements should be required for a representative period 
immediately prior to the required date of appraisal, preferably 
five or more years. (T. at 887; Exhibit 41 at 240). He further 
pointed out that the Capitalization of Excess Earnings - Treasury 
Method utilized by Kevin Yeanoplos to value the Barber Bros, 
entities was described in IRS Rule 68-609. That rule also 
specifically required that a five year average of earnings should 
be utilized and abnormal years should be eliminated. (T. at 888; 
Exhibit 42 at 1334). 
Mr. Papanikolas indicated that he had been involved in the 
actual purchase or sale of five automobile dealerships or 
franchises through his clients and that the same method was always 
applied to compute the value the businesses. (T. at 891-92) . 
The method requires a determination of the present market 
value of the business equity through making adjustments to book 
value and then adding a factor for goodwill based on the adjusted 
earnings of the company. (T. at 892) . He testified that this 
methodology had been actually utilized by the Barber Bros, when 
they sold a dealership they had owned in 1988 known as High Country 
Chevrolet (T. at 893-96, Exhibit 43), when they purchased the 
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Chrysler and Chevrolet franchises (T. at 896-98), and when they 
purchased the Suzuki and Subaru franchises for Barber Bros. 
Imports. (T. at 898-900; Exhibits 44, 45). He further indicated 
that one of his clients not related to the Barber Bros, entities 
was in the process of purchasing a dealership larger than the 
Barber Bros, entities and the exact same methodology was utilized. 
(T. at 901) . 
In applying the methodology in valuing the Barber Bros, 
entities, Mr. Papanikolas made a number of adjustments to the 
current balance sheet of the businesses to arrive at their true 
fair market value of their equity and also adjusted five years of 
income statements to reflect the true earnings of entities. (T at 
919-955; Exhibit 16). He specifically added back all charitable 
contributions in excess of 5 percent of net income into the profits 
of the business. (T. at 928) . He used a straight average of 5 
years income statements as required by IRS ruling 59-60 (T. at 
929) , except he did not include the loss year of 1991 in the 
Imports business because he considered it an aberration associated 
with the start-up costs. (T. at 941-42). Mr. Papanikolas applied 
a lack of marketability discount of 20 percent for Mr. Barber's 
interest in the entities except the Imports Company, which had a 
negative value. (T. at 938); Exhibit 16). He took a 25 percent 
minority discount in all entities except the Pontiac-Olds 
dealership and the Imports Company. (Exhibit 16). 
Mr. Papanikolas explained in detail why he took lack of 
marketability and minority discounts in this case. (T. at 901-
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909) . He also referred to a treatise edited by Shannon Pratt 
entitled Valuing Small Businesses and Professional 
Practices wherein a survey was done of 117 accredited senior 
business appraisers of the American Institute of Appraisers. The 
survey found that where a business interest being appraised for 
divorce purposes represented a minority interest in a company 
controlled by the spouse's family, 37 percent of the appraisers 
would always apply a discount, 37 percent sometimes applied a 
discount and only 26 percent never applied a discount. (T. at 904-
05). The survey also found that in the same situation, 52 percent 
would always apply a marketability discount, 34 percent would 
sometimes apply that discount and a small 14 percent would never 
apply such a discount. (T. at 905-06). He also referred to 
the Estate Planning and Taxation Coordinator, another treatise 
relied upon by accountants and business valuators, which revealed 
that an SEC study regarding of hundreds of stock sales concluded 
that restricted stocks sold on average 24 percent less than the 
prices for similar blocks of unrestricted stock. (T. at 907-08) . 
The treatise also analyzed 27 tax court cases that allpwed 
separately stated marketability discounts. These discounts ranged 
anywhere from 10 to 36 percent, with an average marketability 
discount of 22 percent. (T. at 907-08) . The treatise also 
analyzed 17 Court cases that allowed minority discounts with an 
average discount of approximately 25 percent. (T. at 909). Mr. 
Papanikolas testified that it was his experience that minority and 
lack of marketability discounts were typically taken when a portion 
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of a company is sold. (T. at 909) . 
Finally, Mr, Papanikolas referred to the National Automobile 
Management Guide tQ Valuing an Automobile Dealership published by 
the National Automobile Dealers Association in June of 1995, which 
had been initially introduced by Plaintiff's counsel on cross-
examination as an authoritative source on valuation in the 
automobile industry, (T. at 1010; Exhibit 78) . This treatise 
indicated that minority discounts depended upon voting control but 
averaged, 35 percent. It further stated that non-marketability 
discounts for closely held securities ranged from 7 to 95 percent 
with an average of 4 0 percent. (T. at 1052-53; Exhibit 78). 
Mr. Papanikolas valued Sam Barber's interest in the various 
Barber Bros, entities at $473,700. (T. at 917, Exhibit 16). He 
acknowledged in his testimony that after speaking to Kent Schmidt 
regarding the depreciation adjustment and carefully considering the 
tax consequences of front loading the taxes on warranty reserves, 
he would have changed his valuation of Sam Barber's total interest 
to approximately $560,000. (T. at 918; 954). 
Although Mr. Papanikolas did not consider the impact of tax 
consequences for purposes of his valuation, he did calculate the 
net effect of capital gains taxes on the parties in the event the 
Court ordered Sam Barber's business interests sold. (T. at 910-
914; Exhibit 46). Mr. Papanikolas also testified that the 
automobile industry was very cyclical and was likely at the top of 
the business cycle during the years of 1993-1995. (T. at 917). 
Kevin Yeanoplos. Kevin Yeanoplos had very little experience 
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in conducting business valuations. (T. at 973) . Until his 
departure from his accounting firm at Green, Black and Yeanoplos 
three months prior to trial in October of 1995, Mr. Yeanoplos had 
valued only a total of 10 to 15 businesses himself. (T. at 473). 
He had never valued a car dealership. (T. at 634) . His other 
involvement in valuations had been limited to telephone 
conversations ranging from 5 minutes to an hour and a half. (T. at 
4 69-72) . Although he claimed to be a member of the National 
Association of Certified Valuation Analysts, this was an 
organization created by his former accounting firm which he had 
joined while working at the firm. (T. at 474). He admitted that 
he had no experience in the automobile industry and relied on 
others for information regarding the industry. (T. at 513). He 
had no idea whether 1994 was the best year ever in the automotive 
industry or whether it was even the best year in the last 10 years. 
(T. at 4 94). He then acknowledged that 1994 was the best year in 
the last 5 years and that the industry profits had dropped off in 
1995 (T. at 494-95) but also admitted he did not even look at 
industry averages during the last 5 years. (T. at 494). 
Mr. Yeanoplos claimed to rely on IRS Ruling 59-60 in 
conducting his valuation (T. at 275) and stated that the "fair 
market value" of a business is the price at which property would 
change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, 
presuming neither are under any compulsion. (T. at 476) . However, 
he established the value of Sam Barber's interest in the businesses 
only as to what it should be worth to Sam Barber, based on Mr. 
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Barber's continuation in the business and based on his continuing 
use of his skills, experience and training in the business. (T. at 
477-83) . Mr. Yeanoplos did not utilize minority discounts because 
he believed that Sam Barber had control of all the businesses. (T 
at 462) . 
Mr. Yeanoplos utilized two methodologies in valuing the 
businesses: the capitalization of earnings method which yielded a 
value of Mr. Barber's business interests of $1,276,000 and the 
capitalization of excess earnings - treasury method which valued 
Mr. Barber's interest at $1,967,000. (Exhibit 12). Mr. Yeanoplos 
admitted that the capitalization of earnings method relies on a 
capitalization rate that is totally subjective to the valuator. 
(T. at 506) . Mr. Yeanoplos acknowledged that the Barber Bros, 
businesses are under-capitalized, highly leveraged and present a 
higher degree of risk. (T. at 487-88). Despite this admission, 
Mr. Yeanoplos utilized a capitalization rate of 21.30% for all of 
the businesses, in essence multiplying the earnings of the 
businesses by 4.695 to determine their value. (T. at 514). Mr. 
Yeanoplos acknowledged that a mere two percent change in the 
capitalization rate would change the total value of the businesses 
by nearly 10 percent. (T at 523) . 
Mr. Yeanoplos added back into the earnings stream 100% of the 
charitable contributions (T. at 590), which increased the value of 
the businesses by 4.695 times the amount of the charitable 
contributions. Mr. Yeanoplos further utilized a weighted average 
that placed a greater emphasis on the earnings of the higher sales 
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years of 1994 and 1995 in his valuation. (T. at 594). 
The second method utilized by Mr. Yeanoplos, the 
capitalization of excess earnings - treasury method, is based upon 
IRS Ruling 68-609. (T. at 608). Mr. Yeanoplos acknowledged that 
this Ruling states that the method should be used to value 
intangibles only if there is no better evidence available for 
making the determination. (T. at 608) . Mr. Yeanoplos again 
utilized weighted averages in determining this average income. (T. 
at 610). 
The capitalization of excess earnings - treasury method 
utilized by Mr. Yeanoplos valued Sam Barberfs interest in the 
companies at $1,967,000. (Exhibit 12). However, on cross-
examination, Mr. Yeanoplos acknowledged that if he had used a plain 
average rather than a weighted average of income and had altered 
four disputed adjustments in the Pontiac Oldsmobile store, the 
method would have reduced the value of Mr. Barber's interests by 
approximately $900,000. (T. at 614-631; Exhibits 21, 22, 23 & 24). 
David Dorton. David Dorton actually provided three valuations 
of Sam Barber's business interests specifically for use in this 
matter. He valued Mr. Barber's interest at $525,000 in a business 
valuation dated May 14, 1993. (T. at 739; Exhibit 34). He then 
performed a second valuation dated May 25, 1995, which valued Mr. 
Barber's interest in the businesses at $662,500. (T. at 739; 
Exhibit 35). His third valuation, dated February 1, 1996, valued 
Mr. Barber's business interests at $1,351,300. (T. at 31; Exhibit 
28) . 
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Mr. Dorton did not visit any of the Barber Bros, businesses in 
making his valuation. (T. at 738) . He acknowledged that his 
methods of valuation were largely a subjective exercise. (T. at 
735) . Mr. Dorton also made a clerical error in his valuation by 
taking the LIFO adjustment twice for the Pontiac-Olds store during 
the years of 1990 through 1993. (T. at 753-754; 956-958). This 
error changed his earnings computations by $39,000. (T. at 754). 
Plaintiff's Intentional Delays. The plaintiff intentionally 
caused this matter to be delayed in order to take advantage of the 
unusually high sales years of 1994 and 1995. (Findings of Fact 
Nos. 55-56). As noted above, Plaintiff's own business expert, 
David Dorton, completed three separate valuations of Mr. Barber's 
business interests. The first valuation (Exhibit 34, p.24), 
completed by David Dorton on May 14, 1993 valued Mr. Barber's 
business interests at $525,000 as of April 30, 1993. (T. at 734). 
This valuation was completed prior to the time this matter was pre-
tried on May 5, 1994. After this valuation was completed, 
Plaintiff's attorney, Martin Custen, withdrew in November of 1993. 
(T. at 1228). 
Mr. Barber's prior counsel, Judy Barking, immediately sent 
Plaintiff a notice to appoint counsel or appear in person. (T. at 
1228; Exhibit 75). Despite this notice being sent, Plaintiff did 
not obtain counsel. (T. at 1228). Ms. Barking then sent another 
letter to Plaintiff dated March 15, 1994 (Exhibit 67) and enclosed 
a request for a pre-trial hearing. (T. at 1229) . Mr. Neeley then 
entered his appearance as counsel for Plaintiff approximately one 
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week before the pre-trial held in May of 1994. (R. at 46). 
Plaintiff delayed this matter for nearly six months after * the 
Notice to Appoint Counsel had been sent before obtaining additional 
counsel. 
When Plaintiff finally did obtain counsel, substantial 
additional delays followed. Sam Barber testified that at the May 
1994 pre-trial hearing, Mr. Neeley indicated that he needed to 
update Mr. Dorton's May 1993 valuation because he believed that the 
outlook for the automobile industry was looking considerably 
brighter. (T. at 1132). This testimony was uncontested. 
Ms. Barking then sent Mr. Neeley a letter dated July 21, 1994 
requesting that he advise her "as soon as possible" of the 
information that Mr. Dorton would need to update his valuation. 
(T. at 1232; Exhibit 68). The letter clearly indicated Ms. Barking 
had been attempting to contact Mr. Neeley unsuccessfully. (Exhibit 
68) . In a letter dated August 2, 1994, Mr. Neeley apologized for 
the delay and indicated that he would attempt to get the valuation 
completed when Mr. Dorton returned on August 8, 1994. (T. at 1233; 
Exhibit 69) . Between August 31, 1994 and October 19, 1994, Ms. 
Barking sent three more letters to Mr. Neeley (Exhibits 70 - 72) 
all pleading for Mr. Neeley to specify the information that he 
desired to update the valuation. (T. at 1233-34) 
Ms. Barking then requested a scheduling conference to set the 
trial date which was held on January 20, 1995. (R. at 82-84) . At 
that time, trial was set for March 6, 1995. (R. at 87-90). On 
February 17, 1995, Mr. Neeley finally specified that he needed the 
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tax returns for 1993 and 1994 (Plaintiff having now delayed the 
matter until the end of 1994) and indicated that Mr. Dorton would 
need 60 additional days to complete his updated valuation. (T. at 
1234-123 5; Exhibit 73) . Plaintiff accordingly moved to continue 
the trial date (Exhibit 73) and the Court granted Plaintiff's 
motion, resetting the trial for May 23, 1995. (R. at 91-92) . This 
trial date was over one and a half years since Ms. Barking had sent 
the Notice to appoint counsel and over one year since the pre-trial 
date.2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court entered 61 specific factual findings spanning 
nearly 18 pages that completely supported its orders set forth in 
the Decree. Plaintiff seeks to avoid these numerous factual under-
pinnings by simply ignoring them or arguing against the orders as 
if no factual findings had been made. She has completely failed in 
her obligation to marshal the evidence in support of the trial 
2Mr. Barber then obtained his present counsel, in April of 
1995. Mr. Dorton did not complete his updated valuation until 
after the day of trial, May 23, 1995. (See Exhibit 35 indicating 
effective date of April 30, 1995 but completion date of May 25, 
1995). Accordingly, the parties stipulated to a two week delay 
of trial until June 5, 1995. Mr. Thomas's uncontested proffered 
testimony was that a misunderstanding occurred regarding the June 
5, 1995 setting wherein only one day was reserved for trial which 
he indicated he did not consider long enough to try this matter. 
Accordingly, this case was set for August 28, 29 and 30, 1995. 
Shortly before this trial date, Sam Barber was seriously injured 
in an airplane crash causing the loss of an eye. Trial was then 
delayed for five months primarily because of scheduling conflicts 
in Mr. Neeley's calendar and was set for January 29, 30, and 31, 
1996. Mr. Dorton's updated valuation was again not timely 
delivered and the Court delayed trial on the valuation issues for 
one week until February 5, 1996. (T. at 1241-1242). 
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court's findings and she presents essentially only that evidence 
which was favorable to her position. 
Substantial evidence existed that supported the trial court's 
findings that Sam Barber did not have the ability to take as salary 
the charitable contributions paid by the businesses in which he 
owns an interest. Therefore, attributing these contributions to 
him as salary for purposes of computing alimony and child support 
would operate as an unjust penalty against him. 
In addition, Plaintiff has already been paid her share of 
these contributions through her award of Mr. Barber's business 
interests because all the business appraisers increased the value 
of the businesses by adding the contributions to the income stream 
of the businesses. If the appraisers had considered the 
contributions to the part of the owner's salaries, the appraisals 
would have been significantly reduced. 
The trial court made numerous underlying factual findings 
regarding the parties' incomes and expenses. These findings 
clearly show that Plaintiff has significantly greater disposable 
income than Mr. Barber. Plaintiff has more than enough income to 
meet her reasonable expenses, whereas Mr. Barber has a substantial 
shortfall. Indeed, Mr. Barber would still have a significant 
shortfall even if he could remove a portion of the charitable 
contributions of the businesses as part of his salary. 
Plaintiff has no need for additional funds, and Mr. Barber 
lacks the ability to pay any additional funds to her. Accordingly, 
Plaintiff should not be awarded any additional alimony or attorneys 
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fees. The trial court valued Mr. Barber's business interests 
within the range of values submitted through expert testimony. The 
lower court appropriately weighed the testimony and made decisions 
regarding the credibility of the experts. The evidence clearly 
indicated that minority and lack of marketability interests were 
appropriately applied in determining the value of Mr. Barber's 
business interests. Moreover, the trial court was not required to 
average the valuations in the manner suggested by Plaintiff on 
appeal. 
Finally, the trial court's finding that Plaintiff 
intentionally delayed these proceedings for one and one-half years 
provides an alternative basis for affirmance of the lower court's 
order. The delays have already inured to the Plaintiff's benefit 
and she should not be allowed any additional windfalls through her 
inappropriate conduct. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL 
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF CONTESTED 
FINDINGS OF FACT WHICH WARRANTS 
AFFIRMANCE OF THE LOWER COURT'S 
FINDINGS. 
The appropriate standard of review on appeal is critical to 
the determination of this matter. The Plaintiff seeks to 
implicitly or explicitly attack numerous of the lower court's 
specific Findings of Fact regarding the issues in this case. The 
Utah Supreme Court has clearly enunciated the standard of review 
applicable to an appeal of the trial court's findings of fact in 
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Doelle v. Bradley. 784 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1989). There, the court 
stated: 
To successfully attack findings of fact, an 
appellant must first marshal all the evidence 
supporting the findings and then demonstrate 
that, even if viewed in the light most 
favorable to the trial court, the evidence is 
legally insufficient to support the findings. 
And the legal sufficiency of the evidence is 
determined under civil procedure rule 52 (a), 
which provides: "Findings of fact, whether 
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall 
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and 
due regard shall be given to the opportunity 
of the trial court to judge the credibility of 
the witnesses." Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). A 
trial court's factual finding is deemed 
"clearly erroneous" only if it is against the 
clear weight of the evidence. 
Id. at 1179 (citations omitted); See Coalville v. Lundgren. 930 
P.2d 1206, 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); State in Interest of W.S.. 
939 P.2d 196, 199 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). This Court has also held 
that the same standard applies in divorce cases and stated as 
follows: 
When challenging a trial courtfs findings of 
fact, the party must "marshal all the evidence 
supporting the trial courtfs findings and then 
show the evidence to be legally 
insufficient to support the findings." If the 
party challenging the finding fails to marshal 
the supporting evidence, the trial court's 
finding will not be disturbed on appeal. 
Breinholt v. Breinholt. 905 P.2d 877, 882 (Utah App. 1995) 
(citations omitted). 
In the instant case, Plaintiff has not complied with this 
rule. Plaintiff makes no attempt to marshal the evidence in 
support of the trial court!s finding nor does Plaintiff demonstrate 
that the evidence supporting the finding is insufficient even if 
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viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court. Appellant's 
brief presents the evidence in a light most favorable to her 
position and largely ignores the contrary evidence. Accordingly, 
the lower court's findings should not be disturbed. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY 
ATTRIBUTED THE CHARITABLE 
CONTRIBUTIONS PAID BY THE BARBER 
BROS. BUSINESSES AS THE INCOME OF 
THOSE ENTITIES. 
A. Sam Barber does not control the Barber Bros, entities and 
flQes HQ£ have tJlfi ability to take the business's charitable 
contributions as salary, The Court in Finding of Fact No. 36 
found in relevant part as follows: 
First, the credible testimony at trial clearly 
indicated that Mr. Barber does not exercise 
control over his brothers and does not 
exercise day-to-day responsibility over the 
businesses other than the Pontiac-Olds 
dealership. Even in the Pontiac-Olds store, 
Mr. Barber is not free to simply do whatever 
he wishes without ruining the working 
relationship he has with his brothers. 
Similarly Findings of Fact Nos. 58 and 59 provide as follows. 
The Court finds that the four Barber brothers 
all take approximately equal salaries. There 
are slight differences based on bonuses and 
meeting their objectives. Fred Barber's 
salary is higher because he pays for his 
parents' car and also receives a good business 
bonus. 
The Court finds that in setting the salaries 
in each of the Barber Bros, entities, the four 
Barber brothers have a high degree of trust 
and respect for each other and are not 
inclined to do anything that would be unfair 
or heavy handed. The business relationship 
between the brothers has worked well because 
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each brother has been reluctant to take a hard 
stand on issues but defers to what the 
majority wanted. Because of this high degree 
of respect, the Court finds that Mr. Barber 
cannot do whatever he wants, even though he 
owns a majority interest in the Pontiac-Olds 
dealership. The Court finds that he cannot 
fix his salary without consideration of his 
brother's feelings and obtaining their 
approval. For Mr. Barber to take out the high 
salary would cause great disharmony and 
disruption of the businesses. 
All of the above findings were amply supported in the record. 
Because Plaintiff has neither contested the validity of these 
findings nor asserted that these findings were not supported by the 
evidence, she evidently acknowledges that these findings are true 
and correct. 
Based on these findings, it would be unjust and unfair for the 
trial court to attribute the contributions made by the businesses 
to Mr. Barber. If Mr. Barber cannot elect to take his portion of 
the contributions as salary, attributing them to his income would 
operate as a penalty over which he has no control. 
The charitable contributions made by the all of the brothers 
are a part of their business philosophy (T. at 977-978) and 
significant sales and profits inure to the businesses as a result 
of the contributions. (T. at 155). It is noteworthy that the 
contributions are spread over a wide number of charitable and 
community organizations (T. at 1105) which undoubtedly bring 
significant exposure to the businesses and enhances their 
reputation in the community. The brothers also make the 
contributions based upon deeply held religious beliefs. (T. at 
162) . 
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No evidence was presented that Mr. Barber's brothers would 
make any changes to their business philosophy. Nor was any 
evidence presented that indicated that Mr. Barber could simply 
elect to have the businesses cease the contributions to allow him 
to take the higher salary. Plaintiff failed to present any 
credible evidence that indicated Mr. Barber's brothers would allow 
him to take a portion of the charitable contributions made by the 
businesses as an increased salary. The trial court correctly 
determined that the charitable contributions should be attributed 
to the businesses based on Mr. Barber's inability to control the 
contributions as his own salary. 
B. The trial CPUrt correctly found that the charitable 
contributions paid by the Barber Bros, businesses were added back 
into the value of the businesses and that allocating them as income 
to Sam Barber would constitute a "double charge". In Finding of Fact 
No. 9, the trial court found as follows: 
The Court finds that the value of the 
charitable contributions paid by the entities 
in which Mr. Barber owns a business interest 
should not be attributable to Mr. Barber's 
personal income. The contributions were added 
back into the income stream of the businesses 
by each of the business appraisers and then 
multiplied by a factor of 1.25 to 4.5, 
depending on the valuation, to establish the 
value of the businesses. Mrs. Barber is 
receiving one-half of the value of Mr. 
Barber's business interests. It would be 
inequitable and a "double charge" to add the 
charitable contributions both to the value of 
the businesses for valuation purposes and to 
Mr. Barber's personal income for purposes of 
computing alimony and child support. 
This finding was supported by all the evidence at trial. All of 
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the appraisers (including plaintiff's) made an adjustment to the 
income statements of the businesses by adding back the amount of 
charitable contributions to net income. (Yeanoplos - Exhibit 12 at 
17; Dorton - Exhibit 28 at 12; Schmidt - Exhibit 13 at 3; 
Papanikolas - Exhibit 16 at 5) . This adjustment in essence treated 
the contributions as if they had never been paid and the funds had 
been left in the businesses. The contributions were then 
multiplied, as part of the net income of the businesses, by 
multipliers that ranged anywhere from 1.25 to 4.695 and added to 
the value of the businesses. 
If the charitable contributions had been treated as the salary 
of the brothers, then the contributions, as part of salary expense, 
would have been deducted as a normal business expense and would not 
be included in the companies1 net income. The appraisers 
apparently all believed that Mr. Barber's share of the 
contributions were not part of his salary. Otherwise, they would 
have simply added the contributions to Mr. Barber's salary and then 
subtracted the higher salary from business revenues to determine 
business income. There would have been no reason to add the 
contributions to the businesses1 net income. 
Plaintiff requested and received half the value of Mr. 
Barber's share of the businesses based on this assumption by all of 
the appraisers that the contributions did not constitute salary. 
Plaintiff then reversed her position and requested that the 
contributions be viewed as the salary of Mr. Barber for purposes of 
alimony and child support. Clearly, to value the businesses based 
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upon the businesses' retention of the contributions and to also 
require the payment of the contributions by the businesses to Mr. 
Barber as salary for alimony and child support purposes amounts to 
a "double charge" to Mr. Barber. The trial court was correct in so 
finding. 
Plaintiff's appraisers attempted an interesting manipulation 
of salaries in a transparent effort to overcome the problem of 
double counting. Kevin Yeanoplos adjusted Sam Barber's salary 
upward by $214,780 over a five year period which admittedly would 
have decreased the value of the Pontiac-Olds dealership. However, 
he then decreased the salaries of Chuck Barber by $214,790 and Fred 
Barber by $31,310 during the same period which significantly 
increased the value of the Imports dealership and the Motor 
Company. (Exhibit 12 at 16-17). The adjustments essentially 
canceled each other with respect to value, leaving Mr. Yeanoplos's 
adjustment for charitable contributions intact. Plaintiff's 
assertion that Kevin Yeanoplos increased the compensation for each 
of the three Barber brothers (Appellant's Brief at 31) is one of 
several plain misrepresentations made by Plaintiff to this Court. 
Similarly, David Dorton decreased the income of the Pontiac-
Olds dealership by $18.7 thousand dollars by adjusting average 
owners compensation upward by that amount. However, he basically 
offset that adjustment by decreasing the average owner compensation 
in the Motor Company by $14.5 thousand dollars and the average 
owner compensation in the Imports dealership by $11.7 thousand 
dollars which increased the income in those entities. (Exhibit 28 
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at its exhibits 1, 6, and 11) .3 Because these adjustments offset 
each other, they again did not affect Mr. Dortonfs charitable 
contributions adjustment. 
Moreover, the Plaintiff's own accountant, Debra Kelly, 
testified that on a national basis, the compensation for automobile 
dealers ranges from .003 to .009 of sales according to Robert 
Morris Associates. (T. at 798) . She further admitted on cross-
examination that if Sam Barber had compensation of approximately 
$90,000 in 1995, he would be very near to the middle of the range. 
(T. at 834-35). She acknowledged that if Sam Barber had 
compensation of $150,000, which she claimed he should take, his 
salary would be approximately .008 of sales (T. at 835), very near 
the top of the range of salaries. Accordingly, there was no reason 
for either Mr. Dorton or Mr. Yeanoplos to make their adjustments to 
salary. 
In light of the lower court's finding that the Barber brothers 
business relationship had succeeded based on their equal salaries 
(Finding Nos. 58 and 59), the trial court was certainly free to 
disregard the offsetting adjustments attempted by Mr Yeanoplos and 
Mr. Dorton regarding the brothers1 salaries. Neither Kent Schmidt 
nor Mark Papanikolas adjusted the owners salaries and simply used 
the actual numbers. Therefore, the addition of charitable 
contributions to net income of the businesses by all of the 
3These numbers were derived by calculating the differences 
contained in the adjustments to owner's compensation and the 
owners FMV compensation in the 1990-95 average column on the 
exhibits. 
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appraisers significantly increased the value of the businesses over 
what the value would have been if the contributions were considered 
as salary to the owners. 
The Plaintiff relies on two cases from other jurisdictions, In 
re Marriage of Huff. 834 P.2d 244 (Colo.1992) and Trackze v. 
Trackze. 891 P.2d 1277 (Okl. 1995), which both held that the 
payment of goodwill in a professional practice does not constitute 
double dipping against the practitioner's future income. These 
cases have little, if any, factual or legal relevance to the issue 
now before the Court. The cases also appear to be directly 
contrary to the position adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Sorensen v. Sorensen, 839 P.2d 774 (Utah 1992) (holding that it was 
improper to consider a professional's goodwill or reputation in 
valuing a solo dental practice). 
In the present case, Mr. Barber does not assert that . the 
payment of alimony constitutes a double charge if his business 
interests are found to contain goodwill, as was the issue in the 
above cases. He asserts, rather, that the salary expenses which 
are deducted from revenue to determine the amount of net income 
and, hence, the value of the businesses, should be consistent with 
the salary utilized for alimony and child support purposes. 
Otherwise, Plaintiff receives payment twice on the same funds: 
once through the increased value of the business because the funds 
are presumed to have remained in the business and twice when the 
same funds are presumed not to have been retained by the company 
but instead paid out in the form of salary. The above cases simply 
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do not address this issue and, therefore, are inapplicable to this 
matter. 
Ill 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED 
THE PARTIES' INCOME AND EXPENSES FOR 
PURPOSES OF ESTABLISHING ALIMONY AND 
CHILD SUPPORT. 
The trial court set forth in detail the parties1 incomes and 
reasonable expenses in Findings of Fact Nos. 46-55. These findings 
were supported by substantial credible evidence at trial as fully 
discussed above. Supra at 4 to 6. Plaintiff seeks to overturn 
these Findings based on overt misrepresentations and mis-
characterizations regarding Mr. Barber's testimony. 
For example, Plaintiff asserts that the Barber Bros, 
businesses contributed $18,000 toward Mr. Barber's attorneys fees. 
(Appellant's Brief at 34). Yet the very page in the record 
referred to by Plaintiff clearly reveals that Mr. Barber testified 
that he had borrowed the $18,000, that it was carried as an account 
receivable, that the loan had to be repaid and that loan was not 
income to Mr. Barber. (T. at 191) . 
Mark Papanikolas also testified that Sam Barber had the 
ability to ask his brothers if he could borrow from the Pontiac -
Olds dealership if the amounts were not excessive. (T. at 1058) . 
However, Mr. Papanikolas emphasized that any such amounts that were 
borrowed would need to be repaid. (T. at 1058) . Similarly, 
Plaintiff's allusions to some inappropriate depreciation expense 
(Appellant's Brief at 34) are so vague that they prevent any 
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response. 
In short, the Plaintiff has completely failed to show that 
Findings of Fact Nos. 46-55 were not supported by credible evidence 
presented at trial. 
IV 
BASED ON THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS, 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN 
INCREASE IN HER ALIMONY AWARD EVEN 
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THE BUSINESSES' 
CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS WERE ADDED 
TO MR. BARBER'S INCOME. 
In determining the amount of an award of alimony, a trial 
court must consider three factors: (1) the financial condition and 
needs of the spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving spouse to 
produce sufficient income for him- or herself; and (3) the ability 
of the responding spouse to provide support. Jones v. Jones, 700 
P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985). The Utah Supreme Court further 
clarified the purpose of alimony in Gramme v. Gramme. 587 P.2d 144 
(Utah 1979), stating: 
The purpose of alimony is to provide post-marital 
support; it is intended neither as a penalty 
imposed on the husband nor as a reward granted to 
the wife. Its function is to provide support for 
the wife as nearly as possible at the standard of 
living she enjoyed during the marriage and to 
prevent her from becoming a public charge. 
Important criteria in determining a reasonable 
award are the financial conditions and needs of the 
wife, considering her station in life; her ability 
to provide sufficient income for herself; and the 
ability of the husband to provide support. 
Id. at 147 (emphasis added). Applying the above standards to the 
case at bar, the Plaintiff is not entitled to additional alimony 
even assuming, arguendo. that Sam Barber could take a portion of 
37 
charitable contributions from the Pontiac-Olds Dealership (which he 
adamantly denies he has the ability to do). 
The Court in Findings of Fact Nos. 45 through 58 clearly set 
forth its findings regarding the amount of the parties' income and 
reasonable expenses. The Court specifically found in Finding No. 
53 that Mrs. Barber would have surpluses in excess of $754 per 
month through May of 1999 and $567 per month thereafter, even 
assuming her expenses did not drop after the parties' child reached 
the age of 18 and graduated from high school. The trial court also 
found that Mr. Barber would have a shortfall in his monthly living 
expenses of between $1,008 and $1,488 until May of 1999 and between 
$687 and $821 thereafter. This calculation did not include the 
repayment of debt Mr. Barber had to incur to pay Mrs. Barber the 
lump sum business down payment of $64,159 ordered by the trial 
court. Even assuming Mr. Barber could borrow these funds at a 7.5 
percent interest payable over 20 years, his monthly payment would 
be $516.86 per month in addition to his monthly expenses. 
The portion of the Pontiac-Olds dealership's contributions 
based on Mr. Barber's ownership interest in the company amounts to 
$16,600 per year or $1,383.33 per month. (T. at 1042; Exhibit 51) . 
The Pontiac-Olds dealership is the only entity in which Mr. Barber 
owns a majority interest. Even assuming, arguendo. that Mr. Barber 
could take his share of charitable contributions from the Pontiac-
Olds dealership as salary without destroying the business 
relationship with his brothers, he still would have insufficient 
income to meet his monthly expenses. Because Mr. Barber is in a 34 
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percent tax bracket, his after tax net income would increase by 
only $913.00 per month. Therefore, if Mr. Barber's monthly 
expenses were adjusted to account for his payments for the down 
payment to plaintiff, he would still not have sufficient income to 
cover his reasonable expenses even if he could remove a portion of 
contributions from the Pontiac-Olds dealership. 
Accordingly, none of the three factors set forth in Jones 
above are satisfied in this case: Plaintiff has no need for 
additional alimony because she has a significant surplus in her 
monthly income; Mr. Barber does not have sufficient income to 
cover his reasonable monthly expenses; and (3) Mr. Barber has no 
ability to contribute to Plaintiff's monthly expenses. 
V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CLEARLY 
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN VALUING SAM 
BARBER'S INTEREST IN THE BARBER 
BROS. ENTITIES. 
A. The trial court had broad discretion as the finder of 
fact to establish the value of Mr. Barber's business interests. "A 
trial court's actions regarding the parties' property interests are 
entitled to a presumption of validity' thus, the trial court's 
valuation of marital property will not be disturbed absent a clear 
abuse of the discretion.'" Breinholt v. Breinholt. 905 P.2d 877, 
882 (Ut. Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Godfrey v. Godfrey, 854 P.2d 585, 
588 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993) and Argyle v. Arayle. 688 P.2d 468, 470 
(Utah, 1984)). 
The present case was tried over a period of six and a half 
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days. The majority of testimony at trial centered on the value of 
Mr. Barber's business interests. The trial court appropriately 
weighed this evidence and entered thirty-one specific findings 
based on the evidence and the credibility of the parties. 
(Findings of Fact 15-45). Plaintiff has entirely failed to marshal 
the evidence that supported the trial court's findings and the 
lower court's decision should be affirmed on that basis. 
B. The lower court was free to discard the capitalization of 
excess earnings method as applied by Kevin Yeanoplos. In Findings 
of Fact Nos. 23 through 28, the trial court criticized the 
credibility of Mr. Yeanoplos and his failure to consider specific 
items the court deemed critical to the valuation of Mr. Barber's 
interests. In Finding 31, the court found that the capitalization 
of excess earnings as applied to this matter was not credible 
because it was so far out of line with the other methods of 
valuation utilized by the appraisers. This decision was supported 
by substantial credible evidence, including Mr. Yeanoplos own 
admission that differences between weighting the income averages 
and using actual averages and changes to four disputed adjustments 
would drop his valuation under this method by approximately 
$900,000. (T. at 614-631). 
Plaintiff apparently asserts that this method must be accepted 
as a matter of law simply based on the fact that some other 
jurisdictions on occasion have affirmed lower court decisions that 
were based on this method. In reality, these cases simply 
strengthen the presumption that the trial court has broad 
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discretion in establishing value. 
c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in accepting 
the testimony of Mark Papanikolas. Credibility determinations of 
witnesses are within the sound discretion of the trial court 
because that court alone can assess the demeanor and relative 
credibility of witnesses as part of its fact — finding function. 
P'AStOn v, P'AStPfl, 844 P.2d 345, 355 (Ut. Ct. App. 1992). The 
trial court in the instant case specifically found Mr. Papanikolas 
to be credible, veracious, honest and helpful. (Finding of Fact 
34) . 
As the accountant for the Barber Bros, businesses with 
experience in valuing auto dealerships, the lower court was fully 
capable of relying on Mr. Papanikolas. Although Plaintiff asserts 
that Mr. Papanikolas1 credibility was tarnished because his sister 
had loaned the Barber Bros, a large sum of money and Mr. 
Papanikolas had also loaned the entities $25,000, Mr. Papanikolas 
fully disclosed these facts to the court within the first ten 
minutes of his direct examination. (T. at 881). Mr. Papanikolas 
testified that these transactions did not affect how he performed 
his valuations. (T. at 882). 
The trial court clearly had the discretion to weigh Mr. 
Papanikolas1 testimony based upon his expertise and experience and 
weigh it against Plaintiff's claims of prejudice. Accordingly, 
the lower court did not clearly abuse its discretion in accepting 
the credibility of Mark Papanikolas. 
D. The trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion in 
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applying minority and lack of marketability discounts to Sam 
Barber's business interests because the court's determination of 
value fell within the range established by expert testimony. Utah 
case law clearly indicates that the trial court has broad 
discretion to establish the value of marital property which will 
not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. 
Godfrey v. Godfrey. 854 P.2d 585, 588 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The 
facts of Godfrey are instructive. There, the husband owned a one-
fifth interest in a privately held nursing home corporation. 
Despite the fact that the wife's expert witness testified that the 
plaintiff's interest was worth approximately $65,000, despite the 
husband's admission that he valued his interest at about $17,000, 
and despite the admission of the husband's financial statements 
into evidence which valued his interest at $14,130, the trial court 
found his interest to be completely worthless. 
In reversing the lower court, the Utah Court of Appeals held 
that the lower court was required to value the husband's interest 
within the range of values established by the evidence. id- The 
lower court in essence had discretion to value the property 
anywhere between $14,130 and $65,000. If evidence at trial had in 
fact indicated that the husband's interest was worthless, the trial 
court presumably would have had the discretion to value the stock 
at $0. Obviously, if the trial court in Godfrey had the discretion 
to discount the expert's valuation of $65,000 by over 78 percent to 
$14,130 based on the minority interest in the stock, the lower 
court in the present case also had complete discretion to apply 
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apply fair and appropriate discounts. 
As set forth above, Mark Papanikolas presented compelling 
testimony that this was an appropriate case to apply minority and 
lack of marketability discounts. Supra at 17-19. Mr. Papanikolas 
testified that he relied upon the treatise Valuing Small Businesses 
and Professional Practices by Shannon Pratt regarding a survey of 
117 senior business appraisers regarding their position on these 
discounts when a business is valued for divorce purposes. That 
survey indicated that in a situation where the interest being 
appraised represented a minority interest in a company controlled 
by the spousefs family, a substantial majority of the appraisers 
would always or sometimes take both minority and lack of 
marketability discounts. Supra. 17-18. Mr. Papanikolas further 
presented evidence of the wide spread use of these discounts in the 
automobile industry by reading excerpts from the National 
Automobile Dealers Association publication: A Dealer Guide to . . 
. Valuing an Automobile Dealership (1995) which Plaintiff's counsel 
had previously relied on in cross examining Mr. Papanikolas. This 
treatise states that: 
Various studies involving the non-
marketability discount for minority interests 
have indicated a range of discounts from 7 to 
95 percent; however there is a consensus among 
the studies that discounts average 
approximately 40 percent. 
Although these studies took place over a ten-
year period, each discovered an average 
discount of approximately the same amount. 
Thus we can assume that a non-marketability 
discount is appropriately applied because of 
its historically observed presence as well as 
its relative stability. 
43 
(Exhibit 78 at 11.) 
Most importantly, however, were the specific bases enunciated 
by the trial court in Findings of Fact Nos. 35 through 3 9 for 
applying these discounts. Substantial evidence was presented at 
trial which supported each of the findings, any one of which would 
have supported the court's decision to apply the discounts. 
Moreover, Sam Barber testified that he simply could not keep 
the business interests at the amount at which they were valued by 
Plaintiff's experts and they would likely need to be sold and the 
proceeds divided. (T. at 1143). Accordingly, the trial court had 
ample factual grounds to allow the discounts and valued Mr. 
Barber's interests within appropriate discretionary bounds. 
E. The trial court was not required to average the adjusted 
amounts of the appraisals. Plaintiff asserts that the trial court 
committed a clerical error when the court averaged the amounts of 
the appraisals to arrive at the value of Mr. Barber's interests. 
Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Papanikolas acknowledged that after 
hearing all of the evidence at trial, he would revise his valuation 
to $560,000. In reality, all of the appraisers were cross examined 
regarding their values and the trial court could have raised or 
lowered any of them. David Dorton acknowledged that he could have 
made a clerical error in his valuation because he counted the LIFO 
deduction twice. (T. at 753-754). Mark Papanikolas confirmed that 
Mr. Dorton made this error. (T. at 957-958). 
The trial court was free to elect any method it desired to 
establish the value so long as the value fell within the range of 
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values established by credible testimony. It was particularly free 
to discard all of the adjustments made by the various appraisers 
and to work off the initial numbers they submitted. Because the 
trial court valued Mr. Barber's interests at $728,318, a figure 
nearly $170,000 greater than Mr. Papanikolas1 revised valuation 
amount, the lower court's decision should not be reversed. 
Moreover, the Plaintiff failed to preserve this issue in the lower 
court. Except in extraordinary circumstances, arguments raised for 
the first time on appeal are not considered by appellate courts. 
Standard Federal Sav, and Loan Ass'n v, Kirkbrifle/ 821 P.2d 1136, 
113 9 (Utah 1991) . The lower court issued its rulings in this 
matter on June 10 and June 24, 1996. (R. at 294; 325). 
Defendant's counsel then prepared the proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Decree and mailed them to Plaintiff's 
counsel for his signature. Plaintiff's counsel objected to the 
proposed Findings and Decree(R. at 332-334) yet failed to raise the 
claimed clerical error. The court then set the matter for hearing 
on October 31, 1996. (R. at 341). At the hearing, Plaintiff's 
counsel signed the Findings and Decree and they were filed with the 
Court. (R. at 342). 
Clearly, the Plaintiff had ample opportunity to raise the 
issue in the lower court, but failed to do so. This issue should 
not now be presented for the first time on appeal. Accordingly, 
the trial court's valuation should be accepted. 
VI 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO AWARD 
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VI 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO AWARD 
ALIMONY FOR A PERIOD OF TIME EQUAL 
TO THE LENGTH OF THE MARRIAGE 
CONFORMS WITH UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-
5(7) (h) (1953 AS AMENDED) 
Utah Code Ann.§ 30-3-5(7) (h) provides as follows: 
Alimony may not be ordered for a duration 
longer than the number of years that the 
marriage existed unless, at any time prior to 
termination of alimony, the court finds 
extenuating circumstances that justify the 
payment of alimony for a longer period of 
time. 
This statute took effect May 1, 1995. 
The trial court ordered alimony according to the terms of the 
above statute and provided that the alimony award would run no 
longer than the term of the parties1 marriage. The Plaintiff 
presented no evidence at trial that would have required the trial 
court to find extenuating circumstances that justified the payment 
of alimony for a longer period of time. Indeed, in light of the 
court's specific Findings of Fact Nos. 56 and 57 that the Plaintiff 
intentionally delayed this matter from moving forward, the 
Plaintiff arguably is already receiving a windfall through the 
length of the trial court's alimony award. 
All of the cases relied upon by Plaintiff to support her 
argument were decided prior to the enactment of the above statute 
and, therefore, are not controlling. Accordingly, the trial 
court's decision to terminate alimony after a time period equal to 
the length of the parties' marriage, conformed with statute and was 
not an abuse of discretion. 
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VII 
THE PLAINTIFF'S INTENTIONAL ACTIONS 
IN DELAYING THESE PROCEEDINGS 
CONSTITUTES AN ALTERNATIVE BASIS FOR 
AFFIRMANCE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DECISION. 
The trial court specifically found that the Plaintiff 
intentionally delayed this matter for a period of fifteen months in 
1993 and 1994 in order to take advantage of a brighter outlook in 
the auto dealerships. (Findings of Fact 55, 56 and 57). The 
specific nature of Plaintiff's delay is set forth above, supra. 23-
25. 
If Plaintiff allowed this divorce to proceed in 1993, it is 
likely that the businesses would have been valued at a 
significantly lower value. Plaintiff's own appraiser, David 
Dorton, valued Mr. Barber's interests at $525,000 as of April 30, 
1993 (T. at 734; Exhibit 34 at its 24) . He then valued the 
businesses at $662,000 as of April 30, 1995. (T. at 739; Exhibit 
35 at its 30) . Both of Mr. Dorton's valuations did not include any 
discounts which the court has found necessary and appropriate in 
this matter. Obviously, the Plaintiff has received a significant 
windfall through her delaying tactics. 
The extent to which Plaintiff seeks to benefit from her 
intentional delays permeates this entire appeal. Because 1994 and 
to a lesser extent 1995 had unusually high sales (Finding of Fact 
No. 24), Plaintiff constantly refers only to those years as a basis 
for establishing Mr. Barber's income and the value of the 
businesses. Sam Barber made one of the more cogent points at trial 
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when he pointed out that Plaintiff not only was able to use the 
best two years in the business cycle through her delaying actions, 
but also wanted to rely on only those two years. (T. at 1132) . 
The trial court could have, and arguably should have, 
disregarded the effect of the 1994 and 1995 financial statements on 
the businesses and valuations based upon the court's specific 
findings regarding Plaintiff's delay. However, in light of the 
lower court's willingness to consider those records as part of the 
business valuations, substantial latitude should be afforded the 
trial court's decision. Accordingly, Defendant asserts that 
Plaintiff's delay represents an alternative basis for upholding the 
trial court's decision. 
VIII 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION BY FAILING TO AWARD 
PLAINTIFF HER COSTS OR ATTORNEYS 
FEES. 
The decision to award attorneys fees and the amount of such 
fees fall within the sound discretion of the trial court. Morgan 
v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559, 568 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993). Any such award 
"must be based on evidence of the receiving spouse's financial need 
for attorneys fees, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the 
reasonableness of the requested award." I&. 
As set forth in the discussion regarding the parties' income 
and expenses above, Plaintiff does not have the need for assistance 
with her attorneys fees and Sam Barber certainly does not have the 
ability to pay them based upon their respective incomes and 
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expenses. Supra,4-6. Moreover, the Plaintiff has the benefit of 
the $64,159 payment that she can utilize to retire all of her 
attorneys fees and costs which Sam Barber was required to 
immediately pay. 
Moreover, in light of the trial courtfs finding that Plaintiff 
intentionally delayed these proceedings, the trial court's Order 
that Plaintiff should pay for the costs of Mr. Dorton's final 
evaluation seems eminently reasonable. Therefore, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion by failing to award Plaintiff her 
costs or attorneys fees. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's Findings of Fact entered in this matter were 
all supported by substantial evidence presented at trial. Sam 
Barber does not have the ability to remove as salary the charitable 
contributions of the businesses in which he owns an interest. In 
any event, Plaintiff has already been awarded the value of these 
contributions through the business payout. 
The business interests were more than fairly valued by the 
court and inured to the Plaintiff's benefit. Plaintiff will 
receive a sum from the business payout that is substantially larger 
than the amount she would have received if she had not 
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intentionally delayed this matter. Therefore, Defendant 
respectfully requests that the Findings and Decree entered by the 
trial court following six and one-half days of trial be affirmed. 
Dated this 23rd day of March. 1998. 
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IN THE JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
PATRICIA BARBER, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SAM JOHN BARBER, JR., 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
RE: ALL ISSUES RELATING 
TO DIVORCE 
Judge: Michael D. Lyon 
Civil No. 924901656DA 
ooOoo 
Trial of the above-entitled matter regarding all issues 
pertaining to the parties' divorce came on regularly before the 
Court on February 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 21 and 28, 1996, before the 
Honorable Michael D. Lyon. Plaintiff was present and represented 
by her attorney, Robert L. Neeley and Defendant was present and 
represented by his attorney Douglas B. Thomas of the law firm of 
Gridley, Ward, Havas, Shaw and Thomas. The Court having heard 
extensive testimony presented by the parties and their experts and 
having carefully reviewed the evidence, memoranda and post-trial 
arguments submitted by the parties and being fully advised in the 
premises, hereby enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties were initially married on September 10, 1971. 
The parties were later divorced. The parties remarried on 
September 10, 1977. 
2. This matter was bifurcated and the Plaintiff was granted 
a divorce from Defendant pursuant to a hearing held on January 29, 
1996. The divorce was final on February 7, 1996. The parties were 
married 18 years, 5 months. 
3. Two children have been born as issue of the second 
marriage, Angela, born December 25, 1977 and Adrian, born May 29, 
1981. 
4. At the time of the divorce, Mrs. Barber was age 44 and 
Mr. Barber was age 45. 
5. The parties have stipulated that Plaintiff shall be 
awarded the sole care, custody and control of the minor children, 
subject to the Defendant's standard rights of visitation. 
6. Plaintiff is employed at Dillard's as a retail sales 
clerk in the amount of $1,213.00 per month. 
7. Defendant is employed by Barber Bros. Pontiac-Oldsmobile 
in the approximate amount of $86,000 per year. The Court finds 
that the Defendant testified that he currently earns a base salary 
in the amount of $78,000 per year plus an average annual bonus of 
$8,000. In addition, the Defendant receives approximately $6,600 
annually in personal automobile use for himself and the parties' 
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daughter Angela plus $600 per year in the personal use of credit 
cards, $500 per year in the personal use of a cabin owned by his 
business interests, health club dues in the annual amount of $1,100 
per year and $1,500 for the family's portion of business trips 
taken by Mr. Barber. Totalling these amounts together, the'Court 
finds that Mr. Barber has an annual income of $96,300 including 
automobile use and the value of his perks, which amounts to a 
monthly income of $8,025. 
8. Based on the parties' incomes as set forth above, the 
Defendant shall pay child support to Plaintiff in the amount of 
$687 per month pursuant to the Utah Child Support Guidelines. 
9. The Court finds that the value of the charitable 
contributions paid by the entities in which Mr. Barber owns a 
business interest should not be attributable to Mr. Barber's 
personal income. The contributions were added back into the income 
stream of the businesses by each of the business appraisers and 
then multiplied by a factor of 1.25 to 4.5, depending on the 
valuation, to establish the value of the businesses. Mrs. Barber 
is receiving one-half of the value of Mr. Barber's business 
interests. It would be inequitable and a "double charge" to add 
the charitable contributions both to the value of the businesses 
for valuation purposes and to Mr. Barber's personal income for 
purposes of computing alimony and child support. 
10. The parties own real estate acreage in Roosevelt, Utah 
that shall be sold and equally divided between the parties after 
3 
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costs associated with selling the property are deducted. A 
qualified realtor shall be engaged to list the property the 
property for sale. 
11. Plaintiff shall be awarded the marital home located at 
4685 Porter Ave., South Ogden, Utah. The home has a fair market 
value of $95,000 with a first mortgage balance of $77,000 leaving 
$18,000 equity which should be divided equally by the parties. The 
Defendant's equity of $9,000 shall be deducted from the Plaintiff's 
share of the Defendant's business interests as outlined below. 
12. Each party shall be awarded the personal property 
currently in their own possession. 
13. Mrs. Barber should return the automobile that is in her 
possession to the business. Mr. Barber should not be responsible 
for providing Mrs. Barber with any automobile for her use. 
14. .The parties shall each be entitled to one half of the 
$1,800 currently held by Defendant in an IRA account. 
15. Mr. Barber owns a business interest in five entities. He 
owns a 51.5 percent interest in Barber Bros. Pontiac-Oldsmoblie, 
a 3 9.03 percent interest in Barber Bros. Motor Co., a 44 percent 
interest in Barber Bros. Imports, a 25 percent interest in Barber 
Bros. Automotive Services, and a 25 percent interest in Barber 
Bros. Family Partnership. The remaining interests are held in 
varying degrees by Mr. Barber's three brothers, Charles, Fred and 
John. 
16. Barber Bros. Imports, Barber Bros. Pontiac-Olds, and 
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Barber Bros. Automotive Services are all subchapter S Corporations. 
Barber Bros. Motor Co. is regular subchapter "C" corporation. 
Barber Bros. Family Partnership is, as the name indicates, a 
partnership. Sam Barber actively manages only the Barber Bros. 
Pontiac-Olds dealership. He is not involved in the day-to-day 
operation of the other entities. 
17. The Court finds that all of the Barber Bros, entities are 
undercapitalized and cannot sustain a substantial capital 
withdrawal without endangering the businesses. 
18. The Court finds that the automobile industry is very 
cyclical. The Court finds that the sales year of 1994 was somewhat 
of an aberration in that it produced substantially higher sales 
than in other years. 
19. The Court finds that the value of the Oldsmobile 
franchise has substantially dropped in recent years in terms of 
sales. The Court further finds that General Motors Project 2000 is 
a real issue that will cause a consolidation in franchising. There 
is a very high probability that the Oldsmobile franchise will be 
lost to the Barber Bros. Pontiac-Olds dealership within the next 
three years. Although General Motors will provide the dealership 
with some form of a buyout for this franchise, the Court finds that 
it will not likely amount to a great deal of money. 
20. Although there is no guarantee that the Pontiac-Olds 
dealership will keep the Pontiac franchise, the Court finds that 
Mr. Barber runs a very good business and that he will very likely 
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keep the Pontiac line. 
21. Four separate business appraisers valued Mr. Barber's 
business interests and presented testimony and valuations to the 
Court. The Court finds that the methods involved in valuing the 
businesses did not involve a precise science but involved critical 
junctures where the valuators could exercise substantial 
discretion. 
22. Mrs. Barber presented two business valuations, one by 
Kevin Yeanoplos which valued Mr. Barber's business interests at 
$1.6 million, and a second by David Dorton which valued the 
businesses at $1,351,300. Mr. Dorton had in fact valued the 
business interests on two prior occasions pursuant to this divorce 
action and had valued Mr. Barber's interests at $662,500 in a 
valuation dated April 30, 1995, effective December 31, 1993. 
23. The Court is critical of Plaintiff's valuations for 
several reasons. First, neither Mr. Yeanoplos nor Mr. Dorton 
factored in the risks of the General Motors Project 2000 
restructuring of dealerships into their valuations. The Court 
finds that the restructuring by General Motors presents a very real 
and substantial likelihood that the Oldsmobile line will be lost by 
the Pontiac-Olds dealership within the next three years. 
24. Second, neither Mr. Yeanoplos nor Mr. Dorton took into 
account the cyclical nature of the automobile dealership in their 
valuations. Mr. Dorton's credibility was particularly strained 
because he dramatically increased (approximately doubled) the value 
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of Mr. Barber's business interests solely based on sales in 1994, 
which was unusual in that it was the best year the automotive 
industry had ever had, and to a lesser extent on 1995. 
25. Third, both Mr. Dorton and Mr. Yeanoplos based their 
valuations on Mr. Barber's continued skills, talents and abilities 
in operating the businesses. Yet Mr. Barber testified that at the 
values contained in Plaintiff's appraisals he could not keep the 
businesses and they would need to be sold. The Court found this 
testimony credible and supported by the evidence. 
26. Fourth, the businesses are currently undercapitalized. 
If Mr. Barber attempted to make a 20 year payout to Mrs. Barber 
based on the $1.2 million or $1.35 million values suggested by Mr. 
Yeanoplos and Mr. Dorton, Mr. Barber would need to raid the 
businesses to try to meet the obligation which would further 
undercapitalize the businesses and compound the problem. 
27. Finally, neither Mr. Yeanoplos nor Mr. Dorton considered 
minority or marketability discounts nor the effect of 'capital gains 
taxes if Mr. Barber's interests need to be sold. 
28. The Court finds that Mr. Yeanoplos has had no experience 
in valuing an automobile dealership and very little in-depth 
experience in appraising other types of businesses, having 
primarily operated at a superficial level and giving opinions over 
the telephone. 
29. The Court finds that Mr. Yeanoplos utilized two methods 
to value the businesses, the capitalization of earnings method, 
7 
349 
which valued Mr. Barber's interests at $1,276,000, and the 
capitalization of excess earnings or treasury method which valued 
the interests at $1.9 million. 
30. The Court finds the capitalization of excess earnings or 
treasury method not credible as applied to this matter and chooses 
to disregard it completely. This method was so far out of line 
with the other valuations that it was completely unrealistic and 
the Court had no confidence in it. Accordingly, the Court will 
only consider Mr. Yeanoplos's valuation at $1,276,000. 
31. Mr. Barber also presented two business valuations. Mark 
Papanikolas, the CPA for the Barber Bros, entities, valued 
Mr. Barber's interests at $473,700. Kent Schmidt valued only Mr. 
Barber's interests in the three car dealerships: Barber Bros. 
Pontiac Olds, Barber Bros. Imports and Barber Bros. Motor Co., 
which he valued at a total of $574,580. 
32. Because Mr. Schmidt did not value the Automotive Services 
or Family Partnership businesses, the Court has taken an average of 
the after-discount value (more fully explained in paragraphs 3 5 and 
41 below) of the other three valuations for Automotive Services 
($90,160 - Yeanoplos; $86,800 - Dorton; ($59,700 - Papanikolas) and 
imputed to Mr. Schmidt a value of $78,886 for the Automotive 
Services. The Court has taken an after-discount average of only 
Mr. Dorton's and Mr. Yeanoplos's figures ($64,960 - Yeanoplos; 
$60,872 - Dorton) for the Family Partnership imputing to Mr. 
Schmidt a value of $62,916 for that entity. With these 
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imputations, Mr. Schmidt's total business value equals $716,383. 
33. The Court finds Mr. Schmidt's valuation and testimony 
highly credible. Mr. Schmidt has vast years of experience in 
valuing automobile businesses and has valued over 100 automobile 
dealerships and franchises. The Court finds that he had 
substantial practical hands-on insight and experience. The Court 
finds that the methodology that Mr. Schmidt used made a lot of 
sense and provided validation for the Court's assessment of the 
true value of Mr. Barber's business interests as set forth below. 
34. The Court initially struggled with Mr. Papanikolas's 
objectivity because of his long standing relationship with the 
Barber Bros, entities and his and his sister's financial dealings 
with certain of the entities. However, as the Court listened to 
Mr. Papanikolas's testimony at trial, the Court found his testimony 
to be credible and helpful. For example, the Court finds his 
testimony regarding the applicability of minority and marketability 
discounts in this case to be reasonable and conservative. The 
Court finds his testimony to be honest and veracious. He had good 
insight into the automotive business as the accountant for the 
Barber Bros, entities for a number of years and as an accountant 
for another dealership. The Court also gave his testimony 
credibility because he understood Project 2000. He understood the 
cyclical nature of the automobile industry and the precarious 
nature of the Oldsmobile franchise. The Court, therefore, elects 
to utilize his valuation to provide perspective to the decision as 
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set forth below. 
35. The Court finds that a minority discount of 30 percent 
(except in the Pontiac-Olds dealership) and a marketability 
discount of 2 0 percent is reasonable and conservative and should be 
applied to the valuations of Mr. Dorton and Mr. Yeanoplos. Similar 
discounts were already taken by Mr. Schmidt and Mr. Papanikolas. 
There are several reasons why discounts are appropriate in this 
case, any one of which would support the Court's decision to apply 
the discounts. 
36. First, the credible testimony at trial clearly indicated 
that Mr. Barber does not exercise control over his brothers and 
does not exercise day-to-day responsibility over the businesses 
other than the Pontiac-Olds dealership. Even in the Pontiac-Olds 
store, Mr. Barber is not free to simply do whatever he wishes 
without ruining the working relationship he has with his brothers. 
These constraints limit the value of the stock in the entities 
which Mr. Barber owns a minority interest, both to Mr. Barber and 
to any possible future investor. 
37. Second, the undercapitalization problems, in the 
businesses, Project 2000 and other risks associated with the 
business, combined with Mr. Barber's financial obligations pursuant 
to this divorce, create a real possibility that Mr. Barber will 
need to sell a portion or all of his interests in the foreseeable 
future. At that time, Mr. Barber will not only likely sustain 
these discounts, but could also likely suffer a very substantial 
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capital gain tax based on his low tax basis in the business. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that Mr. Schmidt's and Mr. 
Papnikolas's use of these discounts in their valuations is 
appropriate and that it is fair and equitable that these discounts 
be applied to Mr. Dorton's and Mr. Yeanoplos's valuations. 
38. Third, the Court specifically finds Mr. Papanikolas's 
reliance on the treatises Valuing Small Businesses and Professional 
Practices by Shannon Pratt, The Estate Planning and Taxation 
Coordinator, and the NADA Publication: A Dealer Guide to ... 
Valuing an Automobile Dealership was appropriate in determining the 
discounts in this matter. 
39. Fourth, if the Plaintiff's valuations are accepted, these 
businesses will need to be sold now and the parties will not only 
immediately sustain these discounts, they will also suffer 
substantial capital gains taxes. Mr. Barber's tax basis in these 
businesses is currently $250,000 which means a sale could result in 
a tax liability to the parties in a range substantially in excess 
of $100,000, which would further deplete the parties' marital 
assets. In addition, Mr. Barber would lose his job and the ability 
to pay alimony to Plaintiff. By applying the discounts, it brings 
the values into a range where Mr. Barber should be able to keep the 
business interests and pay Mrs. Barber her long-term business buy 
out and also pay her alimony, which is in her best interests. 
40. Finally, by applying the discounts to Mr. Yeanoplos's and 
Mr. Dorton's valuations, all the valuations are brought into 
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relatively close parity which provides the Court with a sense of 
reliability because the more credible appraisers, Mr. Schmidt and 
Mr. Papanikolas, applied the discounts. 
41. Therefore, applying the discounts to the valuations of 
Mr. Yeanoplos and Mr. Dorton would yield the following results: 
YEANOPLOS VALUATION 
Company 
Pont. Olds 
Motor Co. 
Imports 
Auto. Serv. 
Fam. Part. 
Pre-Discount 
Value 
$514,000 
302,000 
183,000 
161,000 
116,000 
Discount 
20% 
30% and 20% 
30% and 20% 
30% and 20% 
30% and 20% 
TOTAL $1,276,000 
Post-
Discount 
Value 
$411,200 
169,120 
102,480 
90,160 
64,960 
$837,920 
DORTON VALUATION 
Company 
Pont. Olds 
Motor Co. 
Imports 
Auto. Serv. 
Fam. Part. 
TOTAL 
Pre-Discount 
Value 
$535,600 
468,400 
83,600 
155,000 
108,700 
$1,351,300 
Discount 
20% 
30% and 20% 
30% and 20% 
30% and 20% 
30% and 20% 
Post-
Discount 
Value 
$428,480 
262,304 
46,816 
86,800 
60,872 
$885,272 
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42. The Court finds that the value of Mr. Barber's business 
interests are most appropriately determined by taking an average of 
the post-discount valuations of the four appraisers (Yeanoplos -
$837,920; Dorton - $885,272; Schmidt - $716,383; and Papanikolas -
$473,700) which equals $728,318. The Court finds that Mrs. Barber 
is entitled to one-half of this amount, or $364,159. 
43. Mr. Barber should immediately pay Mrs. Barber $64,159. 
Mr. Barber shall make said payment by November 1, 1996. Said check 
should be made payable to Mrs. Barber and her attorney Robert L. 
Neeley. 
44. The Court finds the remaining $300,000 should be paid to 
Mrs. Barber less the offset for Mr. Barber's equity in the marital 
home in the amount of $9,000, leaving $291,000. This amount should 
be paid to Mrs. Barber in 34 monthly installments of $2,117.16 
commencing August 1, 1996 through May 1, 1999 and thereafter in 201 
monthly payments in the amount of $2,413.46 commencing June 1, 1999 
through February 1, 2016 when it shall be paid in full. The Court 
finds that the amount owed to Mrs. Barber should bear an annual 
interest rate of 7.5 percent, amortorized monthly, upon which the 
above payment schedule is based. 
45. Mrs. Barber should be granted a lien on Mr. Barber's 
stock in the business interests until such time as the payments 
owed to Mrs. Barber for the business payout are paid in full. 
46. With respect to the alimony issue, the Court finds that 
Mr. Barber has a gross income of $8,025 per month. His taxes are 
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$2,729 per month leaving him with a net income of $5,296 per month. 
If Mr. Barber's monthly child support obligation of $687 is 
subtracted, he has $4,609 per month. If Mr. Barber's monthly 
business payout to Mrs. Barber of $2,117 is deducted, Mr. Barber 
has a disposable income of $2,4 92 per month through May of 1999, 
after which Mr. Barber will have $2,879 per month because his 
monthly child support obligation of $687 will cease but his 
business payout will increase by $300. 
47. The Court finds that Mr. Barber's reasonable monthly 
expenses are somewhere between $3,200 per month and $3,680 per 
month, leaving him a shortfall of somewhere between $708 and $1,188 
per month for the next three years. 
48. The Court finds that during most of the marriage Mrs. 
Barber was a homemaker and did not work. Mrs. Barber has a high 
school education and one year of college. With the exception of 
one-year when she worked as a substitute teacher, Mrs. Barber did 
not work prior to the parties' separation in 1992. 
49. The Court finds that Mrs. Barber has obtained employment 
as a retail sales clerk for Dillards earning a gross income of 
$1,213 per month less taxes of $218 per month leaving her with a 
net income of $995. Adding the $687 that Mrs. Barber will receive 
in child support, Mrs. Barber will have a net disposable income of 
$1,682. If the business buyout is then added, she will have 
disposable income of $3,799 per month through May of 1999 and 
$3,412 per month thereafter, if Mr. Barber were to pay no alimony. 
14 
356 
50. For most of the marriage, the entire family's standard of 
living was somewhere around $3,300 per month in disposable income. 
During the marriage the parties also had their personal automobile 
use provided, $50 per month in the personal use of business credit 
cards, the personal use of a cabin owned by Mr. Barber's business 
interests worth approximately $500 annually, the payment of family 
health club dues in the annual amount of $1,100 per year and $1,500 
for the family's portion of business trips taken by Mr. Barber 
which the business paid for. 
51. The Court finds that Mrs. Barber's reasonable monthly 
living expenses for her and Adrian are $3,345. Subtracting $3,345 
from her disposable income of $3,799 per month leaves Mrs. Barber 
with a surplus of $454 per month through June of 1999 and $67 
thereafter, assuming no alimony is awarded. 
52. However, because Mrs. Barber is required to live in part 
on her property distribution from the businesses to meet her needs, 
the Court finds that it is equitable to award Mrs. Barber alimony 
in the amount of $300 per month through May of 1999 and $500 per 
month thereafter to the extent that the total alimony award does 
not run for a period longer than the period of the parties' 
marriage of 18 years, 5 months. 
53. This alimony award will provide Mrs. Barber with 
surpluses of $754 per month through May of 1999 and $567 per month 
thereafter even assuming her expenses do not drop after Adrian 
turns 18 and graduates from high school. The award will also 
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result in Mr. Barber sustaining a shortfall in his monthly living 
expenses of somewhere between $1,008 and $1,488 per month through 
May of 1999. Mr. Barber's shortage will thereafter be between $821 
and $1,301 per month because his monthly child support obligation 
of $687 will cease but his monthly business payout will increase by 
$300 and his monthly alimony obligation will increase by $200. 
54. The Court finds that both parties will likely receive 
salary increases in the future, but that Mr. Barber will likely 
receive larger future salary increases than Mrs. Barber which 
should work to his benefit in alleviating his monthly shortfall. 
55. As a partial justification for Mrs. Barber having to 
utilize a portion of her business payout to support herself, the 
Court finds Mrs. Barber intentionally delayed obtaining new counsel 
for nearly six months in 1993 and 1994 after Mr. Martin Custen 
withdrew as her attorney. 
56. The Court further finds that after Mr. Neeley was 
obtained as Mrs. Barber's counsel, he intentionally delayed Mr. 
Barber's prior counsel, Judy Barking, in moving this matter forward 
for a period of an additional nine months in 1994 and 1995 because 
he anticipated a brighter outlook for the automobile industry. The 
Court holds Mr. Neeley in high regard ethically and deems his delay 
to be just an act of advocacy. However, the delay clearly inured 
to the benefit of Plaintiff and detriment of Defendant. 
Accordingly, Mrs. Barber should pay for all of the costs associated 
with Mr. Dorton's final valuation. 
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57. If the Court had more fully understood what had occurred 
regarding the delays, the Court may have made the parties rely on 
the prior valuations that had been completed which would have 
valued the businesses lower but allowed for the payment of 
additional alimony. However, the Court believes that it has the 
responsibility to use the most current information available at the 
time of the divorce and, accordingly, has made its decision on that 
basis. 
58. The Court finds that the four Barber brothers all take 
approximately equal salaries. There are slight differences based 
on bonuses and meeting their objectives. Fred Barber's salary is 
higher because he pays for his parents' car and also receives a 
good business bonus. 
59. The Court finds that in setting the salaries in each of 
the Barber Bros, entities, the four Barber brothers have a high 
degree of trust and respect for each other and are not inclined to 
do anything that would be unfair or heavy handed. The business 
relationship between the brothers has worked well because each 
brother has been reluctant to take a hard stand on issues but 
defers to what the majority wanted. Because of this high degree of 
respect, the Court finds that Mr. Barber cannot do whatever he 
wants, even though he owns a majority interest in the Pontiac-Olds 
dealership. The Court finds that he cannot fix his salary without 
consideration of his brother's feelings and obtaining their 
approval. For Mr. Barber to take out the high salary would cause 
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great disharmony and disruption of the businesses. 
60. The Court finds that Mr. Barber's ability to generate 
income has been diminished. Since his unfortunate airplane crash 
in August of 1995 where he lost one of his eyes, he suffers fatigue 
and can only function three or four hours maximum. Mr. Barber has 
been required to hire people to perform some of the functions that 
he formerly was able to perform. The loss of his eye is going to 
limit Mr. Barber's ability to generate income in the long run which 
also constitutes one of the reasons the court was reluctant to set 
a higher alimony award. 
61. The Court finds that Mr. Barber's parents have 
established an education fund in the amount of $12,000 that Angela 
may use for her college education. The Court further finds that 
the Defendant is a responsible parent that will assist Angela in 
her education so long as Angela is a responsible student. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff shall be awarded the sole care, custody and 
control of the parties' minor child, Adrian, born May 29, 1981, 
subject to the Defendant's standard rights of visitation. 
2. Defendant shall pay child support to Plaintiff in the 
amount of $687.00 per month pursuant to the Utah Child Support 
Guidelines. Child support shall be paid on the fifth and twentieth 
days of each month and shall terminate when the child reaches the 
age of eighteen years, or graduates from high school with his 
regular graduating class, whichever occurs later. 
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3. The parties real estate acreage in Roosevelt, Utah shall 
be sold and equally divided between the parties after costs 
associated with selling the property are deducted. A qualified 
realtor shall be engaged to list the property for sale. 
4. Plaintiff shall be awarded the marital home located at 
4685 Porter Ave., South Ogden, Utah. The home has a fair market 
value of $95,000 with a first mortgage balance of $77,000 leaving 
$18,000 equity which shall be divided equally by the parties. The 
Defendant's equity of $9,000 shall be deducted from the Plaintiff's 
share of the Defendant's business interests as outlined below. 
5. Each party shall be awarded the personal property 
currently in their own possession. 
6. Mrs. Barber shall return the automobile that is in her 
possession to the business. Mr. Barber shall not be responsible 
for providing Mrs. Barber with any automobile for her use. 
7. The parties shall each receive one half of the $1,800 
currently held by Defendant in an IRA account. 
8. Mr. Barber shall pay Mrs. Barber $3 64,159 as payment of 
her half of Mr. Berber's business interests acquired during the 
parties' marriage. 
9. Mr. Barber should immediately pay Mrs. Barber $64,159. 
Mr. Barber shall make said payment by November 1, 1996. Said check 
should be made payable to Mrs. Barber and her attorney Robert L. 
Neeley. 
10. The Court finds the remaining $300,000 should be paid to 
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Mrs. Barber less the offset for Mr. Barber's equity in the marital 
home in the amount of $9,000, leaving $291,000. This amount should 
be paid to Mrs. Barber in 34 monthly installments of $2,117.16 
commencing August 1, 1996 through May 1, 1999 and thereafter in 2 01 
monthly payments in the amount of $2,413.46 commencing June 1, 1999 
through February 1, 2016 when it shall be paid in full. The Court 
finds that the amount owed to Mrs. Barber should bear an annual 
interest rate of 7.5 percent, amortorized monthly, upon which the 
above payment schedule is based. 
11. Mrs. Barber should be granted a lien on Mr. Barber's 
stock in the business interests until such time as the payments 
owed to Mrs. Barber for the business payout are paid in full. 
12. Mr. Barber shall pay alimony to Mrs. Barber in the amount 
of $3 00 per month through May of 1999 and $500 per month thereafter 
to the extent that the alimony does not last longer than the 
parties' marriage of 18 years, five months. 
13. Mrs. Barber shall pay all the costs associated with Mr. 
Dorton's final evaluation. 
DATED this O ' day of VJy^Sl , 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
iluati  ^^. 
5/  (CJ% 
V 
Michael D. Lyon 
D i s t r i c t Court Jv/dge 
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Approved as to form: 
Robert L. Neeley / ? -eAttorney for Plaintiff 
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DOUGLAS B- THOMAS (5550) 
Attorneys for Defendant 
GRIDLEY, WARD, HAVAS, SHAW & THOMAS 
635 25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-3317 
Facsimile: (801) 621-334 0 
IN THE JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
PATRICIA BARBER, DECREE RE: ALL ISSUES ftffl 3 1 Y3% 
: RELATING TO DIVORCE 
Plaintiff, : 
V. : 
Judge: Michael D. Lyon 
SAM JOHN BARBER, JR., 
: Civil No. 924901656DA 
Defendant. : 
ooOoo 
Trial of the above-entitled matter regarding all issues 
pertaining to the parties' divorce came on regularly before the 
Court on February 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 21 and 28, 1996, before the 
Honorable Michael D. Lyon. Plaintiff was present and represented 
by her attorney, Robert L. Neeley and Defendant was present and 
represented by his attorney Douglas B. Thomas of the law firm of 
Gridley, Ward, Havas, Shaw and Thomas. The Court having heard 
extensive testimony presented by the parties and their experts and 
having carefully reviewed the evidence, memoranda and post-trial 
arguments submitted by the parties and being fully advised in the 
MICROFILM wriil 1 9 8 PAGE, 
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premises, and the court being fully advised in the matter, and 
having made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, NOW 
THEREFOR, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Plaintiff shall be awarded the sole care, custody and 
control of the parties' minor child, Adrian, born May 29, 1981, 
subject to the Defendant's standard rights of visitation. 
2. Defendant shall pay child support to Plaintiff in the 
amount of $687.00 per month pursuant to the Utah Child Support 
Guidelines. Child support shall be paid on the fifth and twentieth 
days of each month and shall terminate when the child reaches the 
age of eighteen years, or graduates from high school with his 
regular graduating class, whichever occurs later. 
3. The parties real estate acreage in Roosevelt, Utah shall 
be sold and equally divided between the parties after costs 
associated with selling the property are deducted. A qualified 
realtor shall be engaged to list the property for sale. 
4. Plaintiff shall be awarded the marital home located at 
4685 Porter Ave., South Ogden, Utah. The home has a fair market 
value of $95,000 with a first mortgage balance of $77,000 leaving 
$18,000 equity which shall be divided equally by the parties. The 
Defendant's equity of $9,000 shall be deducted from the Plaintiff's 
share of the Defendant's business interests as outlined below. 
5. Each party shall be awarded the personal property 
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currently in their own possession. 
6. Mrs. Barber shall return the automobile that is in her 
possession to the business. Mr. Barber shall not be responsible 
for providing Mrs. Barber with any automobile for her use. 
7. The parties shall each receive one half of the $1,800 
currently held by Defendant in an IRA account. 
8. Mr. Barber shall pay Mrs. Barber $3 64,159 as payment of 
her half of Mr. Berber's business interests acquired during the 
parties' marriage. 
9. Mr. Barber shall immediately pay Mrs. Barber $64,159. 
Mr. Barber shall make said payment by November 1, 1996. Said check 
shall be made payable to Mrs. Barber and her attorney Robert L. 
Neeley. 
10. The Court finds the remaining $300,000 shall be paid to 
Mrs. Barber less the offset for Mr. Barber's equity in the marital 
home in the amount of $9,000, leaving $291,000. This amount shall 
be paid to Mrs. Barber in 34 monthly installments of $2,117.16 
commencing August 1, 1996 through May 1, 1999 and thereafter in 2 01 
monthly payments in the amount of $2,413.46 commencing June 1, 1999 
through February 1, 2016 when it shall be paid in full. The Court 
finds that the amount owed to Mrs. Barber shall bear an annual 
interest rate of 7.5 percent, amortorized monthly, upon which the 
above payment schedule is based. 
11. Mrs. Barber shall be granted a lien on Mr. Barber's stock 
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in the business interests until such time as the payments owed to 
Mrs. Barber for the business payout are paid in full. 
12. Mr. Barber shall pay alimony to Mrs. Barber in the amount 
of $300 per month through May of 1999 and $500 per month thereafter 
to the extent that the alimony does not last longer than the 
parties' marriage of 18 years, five months. 
13. Mrs. Barber shall pay all the costs associated with Mr. 
Dorton's final evaluation. 
DATED this &7 day of \LJ& , 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
'W. V JAp^ 
el D. Lyon r^ Micha  
District Court Judg^ 
Approved as to form: 
Robert L. Nee 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
***** 
PATRICIA BARBER, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
SAM JOHN BARBER, JR. , 
DEFENDANT. 
COURT RULING 
CASE NO. 924901656 
***** 
BE IT REMEMBERED THAT THIS MATTER CAME ON REGULARLY FOR 
HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL D. LYON, JUDGE, SITTING 
AT OGDEN, UTAH ON THE 24TH DAY OF JUNE 1996. 
WHEREUPON THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO WIT: 
***** 
APPEARANCES: 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
ROBERT L. NEELEY 
DOUGLAS B. THOMAS 
***** 
o 
o 
REPORTED BY DEAN OLSEN, CSR 
847 E. 2800 N. 
NORTH OGDEN, UTAH 84414 
OFS. 399-8405, HM. 782-3146 
CD 
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OGDEN, UTAH JUNE 24, 1996 1:10 P.M. 
THE COURT: HELLO. GOOD MORNING OR AFTERNOON, AS 
THE CASE MAY BE. LET ME PUT YOU ON THE SPEAKER PHONE PLEASE. 
GENTLEMEN, AFTER I RENDERED THE DECISION, I GUESS IT'S 
BEEN WELL OVER A WEEK AGO, I THEN WENT ON VACATION AND CAME 
BACK AND TRIED TO GET IN TOUCH WITH MR. THOMAS AND HE WAS ON 
VACATION, AND I GUESS THIS IS THE SOONEST THAT WE'VE BEEN ABLE 
TO GET TOGETHER. 
LET ME INDICATE TO BOTH OF YOU THAT AT THE TIME THAT I 
RENDERED THE DECISION IN BARBER VERSUS BARBER, I HAD UNSETTLED 
FEELINGS ABOUT THE EQUITIES AND THE APPROPRIATENESS OF NOT 
AWARDING ALIMONY TO MRS. BARBER. I DID RESERVE THE ISSUE BY 
GRANTING HER A DOLLAR A YEAR IN ALIMONY, BUT FELT THAT UNDER 
THE FINANCIAL SCHEME AND THE BUY OUT OF THE EQUITY IN THE 
BUSINESS, THAT THERE REALLY WAS NO ROOM FOR ALIMONY. AND AT 
THE TIME FELT LIKE THAT WAS JUST THE APPROPRIATE THING TO DO. 
BUT AS I SOMETIMES DO, I HAVE A TENDENCY TO RUMINATE A LITTLE 
BIT ABOUT SOME OF THE DECISIONS THAT I MAKE, AND THE MORE I 
THOUGHT ABOUT THIS ONE, THE MORE CONVINCED I BECAME THAT THE 
DECISION THAT I HAD RENDERED WAS NOT APPROPRIATE. AND 
THEREFORE, I INTEND AT THIS TIME TO AMEND THE DECISION SO AS 
TO EFFECTUATE MORE EQUITY IN WHAT THE COURT DID. 
I'M LOOKING AT MY DECISION, AT LEAST THE OUTLINE OF THE 
POINTS THAT I GAVE YOU IN MY DECISION, AND I DON'T KNOW WHERE 
TO REALLY KIND OF TELL YOU TO PICK THIS UP, EXCEPT THAT LET ME 
JUST GO OVER THE FIGURES THAT I HAD AND MAYBE IF YOU'VE TAKEN 
NOTES, YOU CAN SEE WHERE THIS IS. 
I SHOWED HIM HAVING A GROSS INCOME, MONTHLY INCOME OF 
$8,025, WITH 2,729 SUBTRACTED FOR TAXES, LEAVING A NET INCOME 
OF 5,296. AND THEN THE CHILD SUPPORT AMOUNT OF $687, FOR 
DISPOSABLE INCOME OF 4,609. AND THEN I HAD A PAY OUT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S EQUITY SHARE OF $2,417, LEAVING HIM DISPOSABLE 
INCOME OF $2,197. 
AND WITHOUT GOING DOWN THROUGH ALL THE REST OF IT, I THEN 
SHOWED HER HAVING INCOME OF $1,213, WITH 218 SUBTRACTED FOR 
TAXES, LEAVING A NET INCOME OF $995, WITH CHILD SUPPORT OF 687 
GIVING HER DISPOSABLE INCOME OF $1,682. THEN I ADDED TO HER 
THE EQUITY PAYMENT OF 2,417, BROUGHT HER UP TO A DISPOSABLE 
INCOME OF $4,099. 
WHAT I HAD PROBLEMS WITH IS THAT I DON'T FEEL THAT IT'S 
ENTIRELY EQUITABLE TO REQUIRE HER TO -- IN ORDER TO SUBSIST, 
TO LIVE OFF OF THE EQUITY THAT SHE IS GETTING OUT OF THIS 
BUSINESS WHEN HE IN TURN IS NOT HAVING TO DO THAT. NOW, AS A 
PRACTICAL MATTER, THERE IS GOING TO HAVE TO BE SOME 
COMBINATION OF THAT, BUT NOT TO GIVE HER ANY ALIMONY, WHICH IS 
EFFECTIVELY WHAT I DID WHEN I ONLY GAVE HER A DOLLAR A YEAR, I 
THINK IS AN INJUSTICE. AND THEREFORE, WHAT I HAVE DECIDED TO 
DO IS I'M GOING TO GIVE HER THE 2,417, BUT I'M GOING TO 
DENOMINATE $300 OF THAT AS ALIMONY. SO THAT SHE WILL --HE 
WILL MAKE A $300 A MONTH ALIMONY PAYMENT AND AN EQUITY PAYMENT 
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OF $2,117 A MONTH FOR THE TOTAL OF 2,417. 
UNDER THAT KIND OF ANALYSIS, IT'S TRUE SHE DOES HAVE A 
SURPLUS, BUT THE ONLY REASON SHE HAS A SURPLUS IS BECAUSE OF 
HER EQUITY PAYMENT. AND I'M NOT SURE THE LAW WOULD EXPECT HER 
TO USE HER EQUITY WHEN HE'S NOT HAVING TO USE HIS EQUITY TO 
SUPPORT HIMSELF. SO ALTHOUGH THERE IS STILL AN ASPECT OF 
THAT, I THINK IT TEMPERS THAT A LITTLE BIT AND MAKES IT MORE 
EQUITABLE. SO THAT ESSENTIALLY, HE WILL PAY HER THEN 687 FOR 
CHILD SUPPORT, $300 A MONTH FOR ALIMONY, AND THEN A PAYMENT OF 
2,117, AND I BELIEVE THE FIGURES THEN ALL WORK OUT TO BE THE 
SAME. 
AND THEN AT SUCH TIME AS THE CHILD SUPPORT TERMINATES --
AND I'M NOT RECALLING CLEARLY, BUT I THINK THAT'S GOING TO 
OCCUR IN THE NEXT FOUR TO SIX YEARS -- WHEN THAT CHILD SUPPORT 
FIGURE TERMINATES, THE ALIMONY, IF THERE IS STILL AN 
OBLIGATION, WILL INCREASE TO $500 A MONTH -- YEAH, $500 A 
MONTH. AND THE ALIMONY WILL BE EQUAL TO THE LENGTH OF THE 
MARRIAGE. IN OTHER WORDS, THIS WAS A LONG TERM MARRIAGE, BUT 
UNDER THE STATUTE NOW, THE COURT CANNOT ORDER ALIMONY LONGER 
THAN WAS THE PERIOD OF THE MARRIAGE. SO THEREFORE, THE 
MARRIAGE --OR ALIMONY WILL TERMINATE AFTER THAT TERM. AND 
THEN AT SUCH TIME AS THE CHILD SUPPORT INCREASES TO $500 -- IN 
OTHER WORDS, IF THINGS WERE LEFT JUST THE WAY THEY ARE AND THE 
ALIMONY FIGURE INCREASES UP TO $500 A MONTH, AT THAT TIME THE 
EQUITY PAYMENT WOULD REVERT TO $2,417 A MONTH. 
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SO IN EFFECT, WHAT I'M DOING IS DELAYING PART OF THE 
EQUITY PAYMENT FOR A PERIOD OF TIME TO ALLOW HER TO BE GIVEN 
WHAT I THINK IS AN APPROPRIATE SUM OF ALIMONY. AND I THINK 
THAT TECHNICALLY, SHE MAYBE OUGHT TO HAVE MORE, BUT HE CAN'T 
PAY MORE AND STILL PAY OUT SOME OF THE EQUITY, AND I THINK 
THAT THERE WILL -- THAT JUST BALANCING ALL OF THAT TOGETHER, 
THAT THAT WAS THE APPROPRIATE THING THAT THE COURT SHOULD HAVE 
DONE. 
ARE THERE QUESTIONS? 
MR. THOMAS: PERHAPS JUST ONE, YOUR HONOR. SO BY 
REDUCING THE AMOUNT TO 2,117, THAT WILL THEN JUST EXTEND IT 
OUT, HE WILL JUST PAY THE SAME INTEREST RATE, IT WILL JUST 
EXTEND OUT ANY PAYMENT BEYOND THE TIME PERIOD. 
THE COURT: THAT'S RIGHT. SO IT MAY PROLONG THE 
EQUITY PAYMENT BEYOND THE 20-YEAR AMORTIZATION PERIOD THAT THE 
COURT USED. AND THAT'S ONE OF REASONS WHY THE ALIMONY 
PAYMENT'S NOT ANY LARGER THAN IT IS. I REFLECTED ON IT I 
THINK THE NIGHT AFTER I GAVE YOU THE DECISION, I WENT TO BED 
AND THOUGHT ABOUT IT. AND I SAW THAT BEING EXTENDED OUT, AND 
I KNOW THAT PERHAPS PUTS HIM IN A POSITION WHERE HE MIGHT HAVE 
TO WORK A LITTLE LONGER BEYOND AGE 67, BUT MAYBE BY THAT TIME, 
HE'S IN A POSITION WHERE HE'S GOING TO SELL OUT HIS INTEREST 
IN THE BUSINESS AND HE CAN PAY HER ANYTHING THAT REMAINS AT 
THAT TIME. BUT I THINK THAT IN MY MIND PROVIDES A BALANCE OF 
SOME ALIMONY WHICH IS HERS THAT SHE REALLY OUGHT TO HAVE AT 
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THIS TIME, AND YET AT THE SAME TIME, GIVES HER A MEANINGFUL 
EQUITY INTEREST IN THE BUSINESS AND THERE'S NO TAX CONSEQUENCE 
TO HER WITH THAT EQUITY PAYMENT. THERE WILL BE A SMALL TAX 
CONSEQUENCE OF THE ALIMONY, BUT ON THE OTHER HAND, MR. BARBER 
GETS A TAX BENEFIT FOR THAT. AND JUST AS I BALANCED THAT AND 
I THOUGHT ABOUT MORE AND I THOUGHT ABOUT LESS, BUT THAT SEEMED 
TO BE AN APPROPRIATE AMOUNT IN MY MIND. 
MR. NEELEY: THAT WAS THE ONLY QUESTION I HAD, JUDGE, 
WAS WHAT DOES THAT DO TO THE PAY OUT PERIOD OF TIME, SO IT 
JUST EXTENDS THAT UNTIL THE AMOUNT, WHATEVER THAT FIGURES OUT 
TO BE AFTER EVERYTHING IS NETTED OUT IS PAID IN FULL. 
THE COURT: RIGHT, EXACTLY. 
MR. NEELEY: ALL RIGHT. 
OKAY. VERY GOOD. 
OKAY. THANK YOU VERY MUCH. 
I WILL JUST PREPARE THEM AND GET THEM 
MR. THOMAS: 
THE COURT: 
MR. THOMAS: 
OVER TO BOB FOR HIS REVIEW AND INPUT. 
MR. NEELEY: OKAY. 
THE COURT: VERY GOOD. THANKS. 
MR. THOMAS: THANK YOU. 
MR. NEELEY: THANK YOU. 
THE COURT: HAVE A GOOD DAY. BYE. 
***** 
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One of the most common reasons an appraiser is retained to value a 
small business or professional practice is to establish value for a marital 
dissolution. In fact, the adoption of the no fault divorce and the applica-
tion of the equitable distribution of marital property statutes in the 
1970s by the various state legislatures significantly influenced the devel-
opment of the business valuation profession. 
Unlike valuations for other purposes, the valuation standards, ap. 
praisal methods, and valuation dates are as diverse as the geography of 
the 50 states. 
Divorce Valuation Survey 
In preparation for this chapter, we prepared a survey form on business 
valuations for divorce purposes, which was sent to all Accredited Senior 
Appraisers certified in business valuation by the American Society of 
Appraisers. The survey questions dealt with the appraiser's experience 
during the past three years involving business valuations for marital 
dissolutions. Information requested included the number of divorce cases 
handled, the growth trend of divorce valuations experienced, and the 
standards and methods of valuation most commonly used. 
Of the 300 forms sent out, 117 responses were received. Of those 
appraisers responding, 54 percent had been involved in at least one 
divorce valuation during the past three years. The most common reason 
why the other 46 percent had not been involved in divorce valuations 
was that of the low fees generated. Most likely, the low fees are not 
because of the valuation purpose, but because most businesses being 
valued for divorces are small businesses and professional practices. 
Those that had been involved in divorce valuations in the past three 
years averaged 32 divorce valuations during that time period. However, 
certain appraisers had specialized in divorce valuations. The top 20 per-
cent of appraisers (based on number of divorce appraisals completed) 
averaged 91 cases during the past three years, while the remaining 80 
percent averaged 15 cases. 
The survey results suggest that the demand for business and profes-
sional practice valuations related to marital dissolutions is increasing— 
41 percent of the respondents indicated that the divorce cases were grow-
ing in number, while only 11 percent saw a decline (another 7 percent 
decided not to handle divorce valuations in the future). 
The survey respondents, who are generally full-time appraisers, indi-
cated that on average, 41 percent of the other professionals completing 
divorce valuations were also full-time business appraisers, 20 percent 
were forensic accountants, 17 percent were general accountants, 8 per-
cent were business brokers and the subject company's accountant (each), 
and 6 percent were other professionals. Also, professional practice valua-
tion represented 22 percent of all divorce valuations for all appraisers, 
while 24 percent of the valuations were of professional practices by those 
appraisers (the top 20 percent) handling the most divorce valuations. 
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Divorce and Litigation 
Obviously, any appraiser considering divorce valuation is considering 
litigation valuation. The emotions of the parties in many divorces can 
have an impact upon their ability to compromise valuation differences. 
We were involved in a case where the total valuation difference between 
the appraisers was $25,000, less than 5 percent of the value opined by 
either appraiser. Both attorneys and appraisers recommended to their 
clients that the difference in value be split as a compromise—a recom-
mendation that was rejected by both parties, even though the cost of 
litigating the difference was more than the difference in value. While 
this may seem to be a totally illogical choice by the divorcing couple, the 
emotions involved as a result of the breakup of the marriage were greater 
than the logic suggested by all the professionals representing the par-
ties.1 
Those surveyed appraisers involved in divorce valuations indicated 
that 24 percent of all divorce cases ended in litigation where the value 
of the business or professional practice was at issue. Those appraisers 
specializing in divorce valuations experienced a slightly lower litigation 
percentage of 19 percent.2 
Because of the high incidence of divorce valuations ending up con-
tested in the courtroom, the appraiser considering valuations for divorce 
purposes needs to be well versed in effective testimony methods and 
courtroom procedure. Also, as is discussed in the following sections of 
this chapter, each state's courts are the primary body that determines 
the proper standards of value that are to be used in that state's divorce 
cases, so the appraiser in the divorce situation needs to be apprised of 
relevant state court precedents. 
The valuation of small businesses for divorce purposes requires the 
appraiser to be more of an investigative appraiser compared to other 
situations that call for valuation. Small businesses tend to have less 
reliable, compiled financial statements. Also, many times the parties 
have expensed many personal expenses through the business. Therefore, 
the appraiser may need to assume a more active role in restating the 
financial statements in order to better reflect the economic operations of 
the business or reconstruct the revenues and/or expenses of the business 
before any valuation of the business is completed. The appraiser who 
diligently calculates the correct capitalization rate to apply, but does not 
take the time to evaluate the accuracy of the prior financial statements 
from an economic point of view, may find that his valuation report is 
totally meaningless. Many times, it is advisable for the appraiser to 
retain an accountant (or to recommend that the client retain an accoun-
tant) to restate the prior income statements and balance sheets if the 
appraiser does not have the time or knowledge to produce more reliable 
financial statements based on the company's supporting records. 
lUltimately, the judge adopted one of the appraiser's values and did not split the difference 
^This percentage is far higher than for disputed valuations m most other contexts 
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Date of Valuation 
A question that should always be asked of the divorce attorney by the 
appraiser is: What valuation date or dates should be used? Three primary 
dates can be used in a divorce proceeding: the date closest to trial, the 
date of separation, and the date of marriage. As a general rule, a business 
primarily dependent on the efforts of one of the parties getting the divorce 
will be valued at the date of separation. Businesses whose success is more 
dependent on many individuals, location, underlying asset values, and 
so forth, will be valued at a date closest to trial. A date of marriage 
valuation is generally necessary where it is claimed that one of the 
spouses is only allowed to receive one half (or some percentage) of the 
increase in value of the business during the period of marriage. 
Many states have rules as to what valuation dates are appropriate,3 
while many states do not provide any statute or case law that clarifies 
the date. The appropriate date of valuation may be further confused 
because the divorcing couple cannot even agree on what date they sepa-
rated or because the trial date is continually postponed. In one case in 
which we were involved, valuations were required for four different 
dates: date of marriage, date of separation claimed by the wife, date of 
separation claimed by the husband, and the date of trial. 
In those situations where the increase in the business's value is the 
portion to be divided equitably, the increase in value from the date of 
marriage to either the date of separation or date of trial will need to be 
calculated by appraising the business as of both dates. Various allocation 
formulas can then be applied in order to determine the marital portion 
of the business to be divided. There are two primary methods for allocat-
ing this increase. 
The Periera method treats the value at date of marriage as an invest-
ment that should generate an appropriate rate of return during mar-
riage. Therefore, the value of the marital property would be equal to the 
assets' date of separation (or trial) value, less the value at date of mar-
riage and the expected normal yearly returns during marriage based on 
the value at date of marriage. 
The Van Camp method considers the value of services of the em-
ployee/spouse during the term of the marriage and compares that value 
to the compensation received. If the employee/spouse is underpaid, the 
underpayment is allocated as marital property (including a return on 
the underpayment to the date of trial). 
Generally, the Periera method is preferred by the nonoperatmg 
spouse, while the Van Camp method is preferred by the employee/spouse. 
While each method can give similar values for the marital property! 
it is more likely that the two methods will give extremely different 
allocations between marital and separate property values. One method 
of resolving a large conflict between the two allocation methods is » 
third method, called the Todd method and sometimes referred to as the 
3For example, California professional practices are generally valued at the date of separation, 
cial businesses not totally dependent on the owner's efforts are valued as of trial date. 
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combination method. An example of this method, along with examples 
of the Periera and Van Camp methods, are shown in Exhibit 39-1. 
Standard of Value 
Most state divorce statutes require the equal or equitable division of the 
marital property between the spouses. Many of the state statutes require 
that the assets be "valued." However, the statutes themselves are gener-
ally silent as to what standard of value should be used in setting the 
value. As a result, the states' appellate courts have been responsible for 
addressing this issue. This means that there is no universal standard of 
value among the various states and, in fact, there is not necessarily a 
single standard for all divorce valuations in any single state. 
While many divorce courts will use the fair market value standard, 
there are many situations where this standard is not necessarily used. 
As examples, the required valuation of nonmarketable professional 
goodwill or the valuation of licenses or educational degrees cannot be 
based on the fair market value standard because these assets cannot be 
sold in any marketplace. Therefore, the intrinsic value standard may be 
more appropriate. 
Many state courts tend to ignore the value set in a company's buy-sell 
agreement, even when that agreement may limit the fair market value 
of the stock interest to the agreement's stated value. The intrinsic value 
of holding onto the company's stock may exceed the buy-sell value. In 
fact, only 2 percent of the surveyed appraisers indicated that the court 
always follows the buy-sell agreement in setting value, and 11 percent 
indicated that the court gives substantial weight to an agreement. On 
the other hand, 79 percent of the appraisers indicated that the courts 
give some weight to the agreement and another 8 percent indicated little 
if any weight is given to buy-sell agreements by the divorce courts. 
The appraiser needs to be knowledgeable about the statutory and 
case law as related to divorce for each state in which that appraiser 
practices so that the applicable standard of value is considered (as well 
as the valuation date). 
The standard of value used most by the appraisers responding to 
the divorce valuation survey was fair market value—84 percent of all 
respondents indicated that they had used this standard of value in at 
least one divorce valuation during the past three years. However, when 
valuing professional practices, only 66 percent of the appraisers indi-
cated that they used the fair market value standard. 
Discovery 
The reliability of any valuation of a company is primarily contingent on 
the accuracy of the information used in the appraisal. Because of the 
animosity often attendant in divorce proceedings, the appraiser may find 
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Exhibit 39-1 
MARITAL PROPERTY ALLOCATION METHODS 
Periera Method 
Value of Business, Date of Separation $750,000 
Value of Business, Date of Marriage 100,000 
Return on Investment, 10% per annum (simple) 
Yearl 
Year 2 
Year 3 
Year 4 
Year 5 
Value of Separate Property (150,000) 
Value of Marital Property $600,000 
Van Camp Method 
Value of Business, Date of Separation $750,000 
10,000 
10,000 
10,000 
10,000 
10,000 
Market Compensation 
Compensation Paid Di 
Year 1 60,000 40,000 
Year 2 65,000 55,000 
Year 3 71,000 55,000 
Year 4 77,000 65,000 
Year 5 80,000 65,000 
Value of Marital Property 
Value of Separate Property 
Todd Method (Combination Method) 
Return on Separate Property (Periera Method) 
Value of Unpaid Services 
Total 
Value of Separate Property 
Value of Business, Date of Separation 
Value of Business, Date of Marriage 
Increase in Business Value 
Separate Property Portion of Increase 
Separate Property Increase in Value 
Value of Business, Date of Marriage 
Value of Separate Property 
Value of Marital Property 
Increase in Business Value 
Marital Property Portion of Increase 
Value of Marital Property 
ifference 
20,000 
10,000 
16,000 
12,000 
15,000 
Return on 
Investment 
0 
2,000 
3,000 
4,600 
5,800 
Total 
20,000. 
12,000 
19,000 
16,600 
20,800 
50,000 
88,400 
138,400 
(88,400) 
$661,600 
36.1% 
63.9% 
100.0% 
$750,000 
100,000 
650,000 
x36.1% 
234,650 
100,000 
$334,650 
650,000 
x 63.9% 
$415.350_ 
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that one or both of the parties will not be willing to provide the company 
information necessary for the valuation of the company. This is fre-
quently a problem for the appraiser who is retained by the nonoperating 
spouse. The attorney for the nonoperating spouse will need to rely upon 
the appraiser for guidance as to the types of information necessary to be 
subpoenaed from the other party and/or the subject company. Therefore, 
the appraiser should provide a detailed and specific list of documents 
that are necessary. Because the process of subpoenaing documents is 
cumbersome, lengthy, and has specific cut-off dates, the appraiser should 
ask for all documents that may reasonably exist that may have any 
impact on the company value. Many times it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to go back for a second (or third) request of documents. 
Also, the appraiser may need to interview the company's manage-
ment by providing the attorney with a list of all questions to be asked 
by interrogatory or by deposition. Also, it may be necessary for the ap-
praiser to have the attorney go to the court in order to get permission 
for a site visit to the business, or to review records at the business. 
Obviously, because the appraisal will only be as good as the informa-
tion used to reach a value opinion, the ability of the appraiser and attor-
ney, working together, to procure the necessary and complete informa-
tion is of critical importance to the appraiser. 
It should be remembered that the company is not the only source of 
documents regarding company information. T ipany's accountants, 
bankers, insurance agents, and attorneys a1 itain information on 
the company. These sources of informatioi .o need to be investi-
gated by the appraiser. 
Methods of Valuation 
There are no standard methods of valuation for divorce purposes. However, 
certain methods tend to be used more than others. Valuation methods using 
publicly traded company data (price/earnings multiples, etc.) are typically 
not used when valuing small businesses or professional practices. Also, 
many state courts have held a business's value resulting from the efforts 
of the operating spouse after separation are not marital property. As a 
result, divorce courts tend not to use financial projections that are necessary 
to complete the discounted future returns method of valuation. 
The appraisers responding to the divorce valuation survey indicated 
a preference for the capitalization of earnings method of valuation—94 
percent of all respondents indicated that they had used the method in 
divorce valuations of business interests and 61 percent for professional 
practices. Other methods used for business valuation, and the percent 
of appraisers that have used them, were as follows: 
Commercial Professional 
Businesses Practices 
Prior sales of company 77% 52% 
Capitalization of cash flow 73 47 
Publicly traded companies 73 26 
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Commercial Professional 
Businesses Practices 
Adjusted book value 
Excess earnings method 
Revenue multiples 
Discounted future returns 
Book value multiples 
Buy-sell agreement formula 
Nonpublic sales, other companies 
Merger and acquisition data 
Adjusted tangible assets and goodwill 
Rules of thumb 
Book value (unadjusted) 
Liquidation value 
Capitalization of dividends 
Original investment 
Cost to recreate 
71 
66 
58 
58 
57 
55 
53 
53 
44 
42 
40 
39 
36 
24 
24 
52 
62 
55 
32 
32 
53 
42 
24 
50 
44 
37 
24 
18 
23 
21 
Clearly, the facts of each situation will determine the method of 
valuation to be used. For example, a company that is highly profitable 
and not intending to liquidate would not be valued using a liquidation 
method. 
Valuation Discounts 
Discounts for taxes, minority interest, and lack of marketability are not 
necessarily universal when valuing businesses and professional prac-
tices for divorce purposes. In the state of Oregon, for example, the appel-
late court has held that in a family-owned company, no discounts for 
minority interest or marketability are appropriate when valuing an indi-
vidual family member's interest for divorce purposes. 
When using the adjusted book value method, many state courts have 
held that no corporate capital gains tax should be considered unless the 
tax is immediate and specific. Based on the survey, 51 percent of the 
appraisers polled indicated that the courts rarely or never allowed this 
discount, while the remainder indicated that the courts usually allowed 
the taxes to be computed. 
Based on the survey, the application of minority and marketability 
discounts was influenced by the factors that might influence the dis-
count. Given a situation where the interest being appraised (for divorce 
purposes) represented a minority interest in a company controlled by the 
spouse's family, 37 percent of the appraisers would apply a discount, 37 
percent sometimes applied a discount, and 26 percent never applied a 
discount. On the other hand, given the same situation, 52 percent would 
always apply a marketability discount, while 34 percent sometimes ap-
plied a discount, and 14 percent would never consider a marketability 
discount. 
Only 15 percent of the appraisers would usually apply a minority 
interest discount for a 50 percent interest in the company, while 58 
percent would never apply this discount. If the interest being appraised 
represented control, only 21 percent would usually apply a marketability 
discount, while 32 percent would never apply such a discount. 
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Clearly, the facts in each situation will have a direct impact upon 
the application of, and amount of, minority interest and marketability 
discounts in divorce valuations. 
Summary 
Valuations for divorce purposes represent a significant portion of all 
professional valuations of small businesses and professional practices. 
Our practitioner survey indicated that the demand for professional valu-
ations in connection with divorces is continuing to grow. 
A significant proportion (about 20 to 25 percent, according to the 
practitioner survey) of all valuations for divorces culminate in litigation. 
Divorce valuations are complicated by inconsistencies in standards and 
methods of value, and also applicable valuation dates from one jurisdic-
tion to another (and sometimes within the same jurisdiction). The ap-
praiser needs to work closely with the attorney to understand the applica-
ble standards and dates as well as accepted valuation methods in each 
case. 
Discovery is often more difficult in valuations for divorces than for 
other purposes. The appraiser should work closely with the attorney to 
ensure adequate discovery. 
The appraiser involved in valuations for divorces must be alert and 
willing to understand the legal requirements in each case and adopt 
procedures and appraisal methodology to meet the respective require-
ments. 
Selected Bibliography 
Articles 
Arnold, Ralph. "Putting a Value on Future Interests.,, Family Advocate, Sum-
mer 1984, pp. 32-36, 42. 
Broecker, H.W. "Cross-Examination of a Business Valuation Expert Witness." 
American Journal of Family Law, Fall 1989, pp. 213-21. 
Cenker, William J., and Carl J. Monastra. "The Basics of Business Valuation 
in Divorce Settlements." Practical Accountant, January 1991, pp. 18-26. 
Cohen, Harriet N., and Patricia Hennessey. "Valuation of Property in Marital 
Dissolutions." Family Law Quarterly, September 1989, pp. 339-81. 
DuCanto, Joseph N., and David H. Hopkins. "Tax Aspects of Dissolution and 
Separation." Illinois Family Law, 1988, Chapter 17. 
Fishman, Jay E. "The 'Key Man' Concept in Business Valuation Upon Divorce." 
FAIR$HARE: The Matrimonial Law Monthly, June 1982, pp. 3-4. 
Gallinger, George W. "Valuation of Community Goodwill in Divorce Proceed-
ings Involving Closely Held Businesses." ASA Valuation, January 1992, 
pp. 34-41. 
606 VII / Litigation and Dispute Resolution 
Henszey, Benjamin N., and Arnold F. Shapiro. "Distribution of Pension Benefits 
on Divorce: Some Unresolved Analytical Issues." Journal of Risk and Insur-
ance, September 1991, pp. 480-96. 
Kalcheim, M. W. "Problems in Valuing Professional Goodwill in Divorce Pro-
ceedings." Illinois Bar Journal, February 1990, pp. 80-87. 
Kelsey, David. "The Real Bottom Line in Divorce.,, National Public Accountant, 
November 1991, pp. 28-30. 
Klein, Ronald. "The Role of the Expert in Divorce Valuation.,, FAIR$HARE: 
The Matrimonial Law Monthly, May 1986, pp. 3-6. 
Kuenster, Richard A. "Estate Planning, Family Businesses, and Divorce." 
Parts I and II. FAIR$HARE: The Matrimonial Law Monthly, October 1991 
and November 1991, pp. 7-9, 11-14. 
"Legal Briefs: When Company Owners D-I-V-O-R-C-E." Inc., October 1991, p. 
161. 
Maccarrone, Eugene T., and Martha S. Weisel. "The CPA License at Divorce." 
CPA Journal, March 1992, pp. 22-27. 
Mariner, Jack. "Divvying up Matrimonial Assets." CA Magazine, April 1988, 
pp. 54-56. 
McGovern, Margaret F. "Licenses v. Degrees: Is There a Difference?" Family 
Advocate, Fall 1986, pp. 14-17. 
Monath, Donald. "Professional Goodwill: Is It Marital Property?" Family Advo-
cate, Fall 1991, pp. 52-53. 
Morse, Ed. "The Appraisal of Community Property." Appraisal Journal, Octo-
ber 1988, pp. 477-81. 
Murphy, John W. "Using an Appraiser to Value the Closely Held Business." 
FAIR$HARE: The Matrimonial Law Monthly, March 1992, pp. 6-7. 
Parkman, Allen. "The Treatment of Professional Goodwill in Divorce Proceed-
ings." Family Law Quarterly, Summer 1984, pp. 213-23. 
Riebesell, H. F., Jr. "Divorce of a Closely Held Business Owner." FAIR$HARE: 
The Matrimonial Law Monthly, May 1992, pp. 3-8. 
Rosen, Howard S., and J. Burke. "Putting a Value on a Professional License." 
Family Advocate, Summer 1984, pp. 23-27. 
Trugman, Gary R. "An Appraiser's Approach to Business Valuation." Parts I 
and II. FAIR$HARE: The Matrimonial Law Monthly, July 1991 and August 
1991, pp. 3-8, 8-13. 
Zipp, Alan S. "Business Valuation for Divorce." Journal of Accountancy, April 
1992, pp. 43-48. 
"Divorce Valuation of Business Interests: A Capitalization of Earnings 
Approach." Family Law Quarterly, Spring 1989, pp. 89-129. 
Books 
Brown, Ronald, ed. Encyclopedia of Matrimonial Practice- Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.: Prentice Hall Law & Business, 1991. 
Valuing Professional Practices and Licenses: A Guide for the Matrimo-
nial Practitioner. Clifton, N.J.: Prentice Hall Law Business, 1987. 
Foster, Henry H., Jr., and Ronald L. Brown, eds. Contemporary Matrimonial 
Law Issues: A Guide to Divorce Economics & Practice. New York: Law & 
Business, Inc., 1985. 
39 / Divorce 607 
Goldberg, Barth H. Valuation of Divorce Assets. St. Paul, Minn.: West Publish-
ing Co., 1984; Supplemented 1989. 
Kleeman, Robert E., ed. Valuation Strategies in Divorce. 2nd ed. New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, 1992. 
McCahey, John P., ed. Valuation and Distribution of Marital Property. New 
York: Matthew Bender & Co., 1992. 
Oldham, J. T. Divorce, Separation and the Distribution of Property. New York: 
Law Journal Seminars Press, 1987. 
Shank, Steven J., and Richard K. Olson. Practical Divorce Valuation and Finan-
cial Analysis. Eau Claire, Wis.: Professional Education Systems, 1986. 
Skoloff, Gary N., and Theodore P. Orenstein. When a Lawyer Divorces: How to 
Value a Professional Practice; How to Get Extraordinary Remedies. Chicago: 
American Bar Association, 1986. 
Trugman, Gary R. Equitable Distribution Value of Small Closely Held Busi-
nesses and Professional Practices. (Thesis for Degree of Master of Valuation 
Sciences, Lindenwood College.) Morristown, N.J.: Gary R. Trugman, 1990. 
Zipp, Alan S. Handbook of Tax and Financial Planning for Divorce and Separa-
tion. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1985. 
Tab 5 
endanfs Exhibit. 
»No. 4^4CYte^-— 
rk's Initials 
I. Minority Interest It is well established that a minority interest in a business enterprise lacks the 
Discounts ability to control the business and is therefore inherently less valuable than a 
corresponding controlling interest 
The value of a controlling interest lies in its power to exercise any or all of a 
variety of rights typically associated with control, including the authority to 
do the following: 
/ • Appoint management 
/ • Elect directors • 
/ • Set management compensation and perks 
/ • Set policy and change the course of the business 
>' • Acquire or liquidate assets 
/ • Make acquisitions 
• Liquidate, sell, dissolve, or recapitalize the company 
• Sell or acquire stock 
• Declare dividends 
• Change the articles or bylaws 
Revenue Ruling 59-60 of the Internal Revenue Service states: 
/ Control of a corporation, either actual or in effect, representing as 
/ it does an added element of value, may justify a higher value for a 
specific block of stock. 
The size of the minority discount depends upon the present and anticipated 
distribution of ownership and other factors which affect voting control. A list 
of studies regarding minority interest discounts has been provided in Appen-
dix C. While discounts for minority interests by the courts have generally 
ranged from 15 to 60 percent, the average is around 35 percent. 
Picking a minority interest discount is always going to be a subjective 
judgment, based in part upon the particular ownership situation. As an 
example, a 2 percent ownership would carry a much different discount in the 
following two situations: 
Example 1 
Owner A: 98% 
Owner B: 2% 
Example 2 
Owner A: 49% 
Owner B: 2% 
Owner C: 49% 
In each of the above examples, Owner B owns 2 percent of the company; 
however in the second example the 2 percent represents swing or control 
stock. In the first case owner B is at the mercy of owner A. The minority 
interest in Example 1 would therefore have a high discount, and in Example 
2, a much lower discount 
Non-markctabilitv In Revenue Ruling 77-17, the IRS recognizes that closely held securities 
Discounts {$«**. that are not traded on a public security exchange) lack the inherent 
liquidity of publicly traded securities, and "thus arc not as attractive for, 
investment purposes.? In other words, they are not as marketable. Accord-
ingly, it is accepted valuation practice to discount the value of closely held 
fwb l i ihH by 0»t NinontJ Automobile DcaJcn A J M > O M M M 
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Minority 
Interests 
securities to reflect this disparity. Such discounts are commonly known 
non-marketability discounts. In the following discussion we will see he 
marketability (or lack thereof) can affect the value of both minority ai 
controlltng4nterests. 
Various studies involving the non-marketability discount for minority int< 
ests have indicated a range of discounts from 7 to 95 percent; however, the 
is a consensus among the studies that discounts average approximately 
percent 
Although these studies took place over a ten-year period, each discovered 
average discount of approximately the same amount. Thus we can assume tl 
a non-marketability discount is appropriately applied because of its histc 
cally observed presence as well as its relative stability. 
Studies of non-marketable discounts have centered around comparing am 
length transactions of non-marketable stock with the price at which it trac 
in a subsequent initial public offering (IPO), and the relationship betwt 
sales of restricted securities (securities in a public company that are i 
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission and are theref 
not freely tradable on an exchange) and their publicly traded counterp: 
which are reeistered. 
\ 
Controlling 
Interests 
A 
Mr. John D. Emory, ASA, does studies of IPO securities even* year. 1 
average discount of these studies is 46 percent. The ranre is from 40 to 
percent. (Sec Business Valuation Review, March 1994.) 
At least 8 studies of restricted securities have been done since 1 %6 by varii 
parties. Average discounts for these studies is 34 percent. The range 
average discount is 25.8 to 45 percent. {FAIRSHARE. The Matrimonial I 
Monthly, Vol.12, No. 6, June 1992.) For more detailed infoimation on tli 
studies, refer to the valuation references listed in the bibliography. 
In the case of automobile dealerships being valued on a controlling inte 
basis, we need to look at the intrinsic marketability of the underlying comp 
as a guide in determining an appropriate non-marketability discount 
The primary asset of an automobile dealership is the ability to sell a cer 
brand of automobiles, and this asset resides not with the company, but \ 
a prescribed individual named by the manufacturer/Thus, it is not tcchnic 
an asset of the company that can be sold. Most sales agreements (manufac 
ers are reluctant to call them "franchises") are structured in this fashion, 
for this reason such companies are inherently more difficult to sell. Any i 
owner must be approved by the manufacturer as far as the sales agrecme 
concerned. 
Experience with this type of company indicates that the universe of potei 
buyers is not great and selling a dealership is likely to be time consuming 
the other hand, a controlling owner can dictate that the company be so 
most instances. Thus, the controlling owner is operating from a much r 
marketable position than a minority owner, and the non-marketability 
count would be less. 
Puhliihed by the NtuonaJ Automobile D o t e n Aiutciaiion 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
PATRICIA BARBER, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ; 
SAM JOHN BARBER, JR., ] 
Defendant. ] 
> PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION 
TO PROPOSED FINDINGS OF 
1 FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND DIVORCE DECREE 
> Judge: Lyon 
> Civil No. 924901656 
Comes now p l a in t i f f , Pa t r i c i a Barber, by and through 
her a t torney of record, Robert L. Neeley, and objects to 
Defendant's proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Decree of Divorce as follows, to -wi t : 
1. P l a in t i f f objects to the omission in the proposed 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce tha t p l a i n t i f f ' s 
property award be secured by a l i en on one-half of defendant 's 
stock. On Page 18 of the Court Ruling on the 10th day of June, 
1996, the Court ordered defendant, Sam Barber, to pay p l a i n t i f f 
$64,159.00 as a down payment, the balance to be secured by a l i en 
(J )»» 
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on one-half of defendant's stock. 
2. Plaintiff objects to proposed Conclusions of Law 9 
and 10, together with paragraph 9 and 10 of the Decree of Divorce 
and Findings of Fact 43 and 44 relating to the issue of plaintiff 
receipt of a down payment of $64,159.00. 
3. The Court, on Page 18 of the Court Ruling, ordered 
defendant to pay plaintiff $64,159.00 as a down payment. On Page 
6 of the Court Ruling, the Court suggested that plaintiff's 
interest in the Barber Brothers stock be reduced by $9,000.00, 
one-half the equity in the family residence located at 4685 
Porter Avenue, Ogden, Utah. Defendant, in preparation of the 
pleadings, deducted $9,000.00 from the down payment due plaintiff 
rather than offsetting it against plaintiff's interest in 
defendant's stock. The Court ordered plaintiff, Patricia Barber, 
to return to defendant her automobile and ordered plaintiff to 
pay all of the valuation expenses of David Dorton. The Court 
also ordered each party to pay their own attorney fees. 
Plaintiff is in need of the down payment of $64,159.00 to 
purchase an automobile and pay her debts. Defendant's pleadings 
do not conform to the Court order that defendant pay $64,159.00 
immediately to plaintiff, Patricia Barber. 
4. On Page 5 of the Court Ruling of June 24, 1996, the 
Court extended the pay out period for defendant, Sam Barber, to 
pay plaintiff her portion of the Barber Brothers stock. The 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION 
BARBER VS BARBER 
Civil No. 924901656 
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Court estimated the pay out may take until defendant, Sam Barber, 
was age 67. The Court clearly intended plaintiff, Patricia 
Barber, to receive a down payment of $64,159.00 and the balance 
to be paid over a twenty to twenty-two year period payable at the 
rate of $2,117.00 per month until paid in full. 
DATED this 7 ? ^day of September, 1996. 
W06ERT L. NEE^EY ~7 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Plaintiff's Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Divorce Decree to defendant's attorney, Douglas B. C~f'5?!7 
Thomas, 84-9 W. Hill Field Rd. #202, (Barnes Bank Bldg.), Layton, 
Utah 84041, this / ^ ^ d aV o f September, 1996, postage prepaid. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH 
PATRICIA BARBER, 
Plaintiffs), 
vs. 
SAM JOHN BARBER, JR., 
Defendant(s). 
HON. MICHAEL D. LYON 
Date: October 31, 1996 
Case No. 924901656 
Dean Olsen, Reporter 
Angela Taylor, Clerk 
This is the time set for hearing on objection to the Commissioner's 
recommendations. The plaintiff is present and represented by Robert Neeley. The 
defendant is present and represented by Doug Thomas. 
The parties have reached a settlement and the Mr. Neeley has signed the findings 
and decree, approving them as to form. 
The parties agree that the payments to the plaintiff for child support, alimony and 
property settlement will be made in two equal installments. The automobile will be 
returned to the defendant by November 30, 1996. 
The court executes the findings and decree in open court. 
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